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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
The period of 1775 to 1825 might well be tialled the half-
century of revolution. This period was initiated by the revolution 
of the British North American colonies. It was accelerated by the 
French revolution in Europe. It was climaxed by the revolution of 
Spain's entire colonial holdings in Latin America. Not only was 
the shot of 1775 heard around the world, it returned to echo against 
the lofty Andes Mountains of South America. 
I. STATEMEN~ OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this thesis is to make a study of the rela-
tions between the United States and Argentina, leading to the 
recognition of Argentina. The period cove ed will essentially be 
from August 27, 1810, the date of the first Uni t ed States mission 
to Argentina, to January 27, 1823, the date of formal recogniti on 
of Argentina by the United States. The name Argentina will be 
absent from this study since it is t he modern day name f or a sim-
ilar territory known during this period as first, the United 
Provinces of the Rio de la plata, and as the Republic of Buenos 
Aires when recognition was accorded. 
Ida.jar emphasis in this study has been placed upon the agents 
of this pre-recognition period and the neutrality and r ecognition 
policy as established by the Uni ted States. Chapter II has been 
devoted to agents of the United States sent to the United Provinces. 
Chapter III has been devoted to the agents sent by la Plata to the 
United States. The neutrality poliC"iJ of the United States, as it 
affected Spanish America, is the subject for Chapter ~V, and the 
recognition policy of the United States is discussed in Chapter V. 
Texts of the more important documents used in this thesis have been 
placed in the Appendix. A list of these has been included in the 
table of contents, and the reader is referred to t hem by footnotes. 
II. LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES 
2 
To exhaust the material available ~rtaining to this subject 
would be a lifetime work. Considerable material is located in the 
United States, Argentine and Spanish archives, and other material 
would be found in the government records of every ma jor country of 
Europe existing at that time. The writer has attempted to show the 
eff ects of other powers upon the policy of the United States, but 
here he has limi ted the study to Great Britain and Spain. This 
was necessary because of time and the inability to obt ain materials 
from foreign archives. 
The major portion of the material for this study has been 
taken from three primary sources. First, and most important, 
microfilmed copies of the correspondence of American and Argentine 
agents; second, the American State Papers; and third, the Annals of 
Congress. Considerable use has also been made of William R. Man-
ning's Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the 
Independence of the Latin-American Nations, where the above three 
3 
primary sources were incomplete. The United States and the Indepen-
dence of Latin Jurerica, 1800-1830, by Arthur P. Whitaker, was also 
referred to occasionally during the writing of the thesis. Other 
sources used are listed in the formal bibliography". 
CHAPTER II 
AGENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED PROVINCES 
Leaders in both North and South America shoi~ed an interest 
in independence for Spanish America some years before the people of 
South America were to announce formally their severence of connec-
tions with Spain . In 1798, Francisco de Miranda tried to interest 
Great Britain and the United States in his schemes to foment revolu-
tion in the colonies of Spain. The American minister at London, 
Rufus King, was a strong supporter of some of his plans, and he 
had succeeded in arousing the interest of Alexander Hamilton. 
These projects were abandoned when Great Britain refused to take 
part, and the United States, following the same line, withheld 
official approval of the schemes.l But this refusal of aid did 
not mean the United States was not keeping a close watch on hap-
penings in the area to her South. Because of her interest in 
commerce, Great Britain also maintained an interest in this ar ea . 
By 1810, important changes had taken place in Buenos Aires. 
Liniers, the Fr11nchman who had led the opposition to the British 
1 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 19Ii'JY, 376-77. Stuart 
goes on to add that Miranda "was forced to content himself with 
organizing a small filibustering force in New York, without aid, 
but also without interference, from the United States government. 11 
This force sailed for South America , but it met with failure. 
invasions of 1806 and later became viceroy, was removed. On May 
25, 1810, a junta gobernativa was established.2 This date can be 
used as a starting point for the independence of l a Plata region. 
5 
The importance of Spanish .America as an outlet for .American 
products was becoming more important . David C. De Forest, an 
.American businessman in Buenos Aires, had written to Secretary of 
State James Madison on October 4, 1807, informing him of the "embar-
rassments under which American commerce struggled at Buenos Aires. 113 
Treasury Department reports show that by 1811 American export trade 
to South America was valued at $8,310,000.4 
On August 27, 1810, the first American agent, Joel Robert 
Poinsett, was appointed as "Special Agent of the United States to 
South America. 11 5 He was to have a position similar to that held 
by United States agents in the West Indies.6 
2 This was a military gr oup set up for administration during 
the emergency. As such, it was not an independent government when 
organized, but it does mark t he end of effective rule by Spain. 
3 Frederic L. Paxson, The Independence of the South American 
Republics (Philadelphia : Ferrisand Leach, 1903T, Io'o.--
4 .American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation (Washing-
ton: Gales and Seaton, 1858), I, 892. -
5 J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile .American 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), 58, n. J. 
Manning quotes these same instructions under the date of June 28, 
1810, but Rippy states that this is a mis take on the part of Man-
ning. Rippy 1s source -for the August date was the Poinsett paper~, 
while Manning used the House Report No. 72, 20th Congress, 2nd 
session, p. 7. --
6 The position was "agent for Seamen and Commerce." 
This is the . same Poinsett who later becomes well knovm for his 
exploits in Mexico. 
6 
Poinsett was instructed "to proceed, without delay, to Buenos 
Aires. 11 7 His instructions indicate that the United States was well 
aware of the possibilities that existed in South America, and espec-
ially in la Plata region, by stating that 
The real ~swell as ostensible object of your mission is 
to explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United 
States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to 
transmi t seasonable information on the subject.8 
The governing body of Buenos Aires was certainly willing to 
establish friendly relations with the United States. This was made 
evident by a letter addressed to President Madison, dated February 
11, 1811, from the newly formed junta of Buenos Aires. The junta 
expressed the hope 
that it will be agreeable to your E.~cellency, that the United 
States should tighten with the Provinces on the Rio de la 
Plata the common chain of Nations, by a cordiality more firm 
and expressive.9 
A letter dated February 13, 1811, notified t he United States of the 
acceptance of Poinsett as a commerci al agent.10 
7 William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American 
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925T,I"";" 6-7. 
Letter from Secretary of State Robert Smith to Joel Poinsett, 
appointed Special Agent of the United States to South America, 
June 28, 1810. See footnote 5 concerning this date. 
8 Loe. cit. 
9 State Department, MS. Notes from the Argentine Legation, 
Vol. I, Part 1. Letter from the governing junta to President James 
Madison, February 11, 1811. 
10 Junta to Madison, Rebruary 13, 1811, MS. 
the Argentine Legation, I, 1. 
Notes from 
The destiny of these provinces mus.t depend on themselves. 
Should such a revolution for complete independence instead 
of just against French rule however take pl ace, it cannot be 
doubted that our relations with them will be more intimate, 
and our friendship stronger than it can be while t hey are 
colonies of an European power.12 
8 
Poinsett endeavored to carry this project out, but at almost every 
step he encountered uneas i ness because of Great Britain. The English 
were interested in stopping any break between Spain and her colonies 
because of the English-Spanish al l i ance against Nappleon in the 
European was at thi s time. Interest -viras growing in Europe for 
arbitration between Spain and her colonies, and Britain was taking 
a lead in this movement.13 
Poinsett was certainly no more than an average diplomat , 
especially in South America during this pe riod. His diplomatic use 
was hampered by his craving for adventure and exd.tement. He had 
an intense desire for military service, and expected to be called 
home in case of war with :Engl and . With his failure to bring about 
independence in la Pl ata, he had decided to cross the Andes to Chile 
in hope of finding more activity . In June , 18ll, partly in response 
to Poinsetts requests, a consul for Buenos Aires was appointed and 
Poinsett was names consul-general for Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru. liJ. 
12 Manning, EE. cit. , I , 11 . Monroe to Poinsett, April 
JO, 1811. 
13 British mediation and arbitra tion is di scussed in more 
detail in Chapter V. 
liJ. Rippy, EE· cit., 39 . 
Poinsett left for Chile in November, 1811, and did not return to 
Buenos Aires until almost three years later.15 
9 
With the appoi ntment of a consul for Buenos Aires, we find 
two types of American agents in South Amer ica . The consul was sent 
to handle commercial relations, while agents wer e being sent t o ob-
serve conditi ons of a general nature and serve as political repre-
sentatives and reporters for the United States gover nment. It was 
under stood t hat the two men were to work together whenever possible. 
The new American consul f or Buenos Aires, Wi lli am G. Miller, 
an American businessman, was commi ssioned on June 24, 1812 .16 Si nce 
Poinsett had crossed the Andes into Chile, Miller served as both 
consul and general agent for some t ime in the Unit ed Provinces . 
Miller's reports furnish a picture of t he happenings in Buenos Aires 
and indicate t hat the year 1812 was a t urbulent one f or that govern-
ment. Juan Mart(n Pueyrredcfn had become a member of t he t hree member 
executi ve, and the assembly and execut i ve were not on the best of 
15 While in Chile, Poinsett took an active part i n Chilean 
politics and his return to Buenos Aires was hastened in part by a 
change made in the government of Chil e . These ac tions of course 
destroyed his usefulne ss as an agent . He r eturned t o the United 
States, and on July 16, 1815, was congratul ated by Monroe in t he 
name of t he President on the success of his missionl Henry M. 
Wriston, Executive Agents in Amer i can Foreign Rela tions (Bal timore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), 112. 
16 John P. Harrison, Latin American Specialist, National 
Archives, Letter of May 11, 1953, to the 1Vriter. lVIr . Har rison 
states that Luis Godefroy, a merchant of Montevi deo, was appointed 
consul at Buenos Aires on April 26 , 1811. This was a recess 
appointment and was rejected by the Senate on November 18, 1811. 
Godefroy was in the United States at the time of his appointment . 
terms. Miller states that more than one "warm discussion" took 
place within the assembly and between the two departments of 
government.17 
10 
Miller conveys the feeling that the demands for independence 
were growing stronger., but still had not become the desire of any 
large majority. The general belief was that independence would not 
be announced innnediately unless some of the µ:i.triots forced the 
executive to issue a declaration. It was felt necessary to wait 
until the fall of Montevideo, just across the river from Buenos 
Aires , or until a large supply of arms could be obtained.18 
Shortly after Miller' s dispatch of July 16, a group of 
patriots attempted to f orce the government into independence , but 
the over-ambitious were handled in the manner familiar to South 
American revolutionary movements. After they had returned to t heir 
homes in the evening, they were arrested "and sent <2ff to the Army 
the ensuing (sic) morning •••• 11 Miller adds that 11 tranquility 
has since reigned: The executions have not yet stopped [sic]: 
29 have been shot: 4 others are under sentence of death. • • • 1119 
The United States consul at Buenos Aires gives the impres-
sion that a large gr oup of pe ople were in favor of independence, 
17 State Department, MS. Despatches from United States 
Consuls in Buenos Aires, I, 1. Letter from W. G. Miller to 
Secreta.:ryof State James Monroe, April 30, 1812. 
18 Ibid., July 16, 1812. 
19 Ibid., August 10, 1812. 
11 
but could not get together on the basis of their demands. One 
group, composed of the higher class and European Spaniard, was in 
favor of independence based on the government s:imilar to t he pre-war 
government, With only their group in control. The other group, 
composed largely of Creoles and middle class businessmen, f avored 
independence based upon t he idea of the United States, which woul d 
place t heir class in contro1. 20 The group opposing independence for 
the United Provinces was split into factions in a s :imilar manne r . 
This internal conflict for control was one f actor in delaying t he 
establishment of political stability even after independence Md 
been announced. 
During the War of 1812, Am er ican interest was confined 
almos t entir ely to the war with Great Britain. During t his period, 
the United Provinces turned t heir att enti on toward Great Britain 
because of the realization that the main threat to their indepen-
dence would come from Europe. Attempts were made at mediation 
be~«een Spain and the provinces, but t hese all ended in f ailure .21 
At this time the impor tance of the United States to South 
Amer i can independence was made more clear. The Uni ted States was 
to provide the i nspi ration and s ome of t he supplies , but it was to 
Great Bri tain that the colonies looked f irst. It must be r emembered 
that most of t he troubles of South America were connected vlit h Europe , 
20 Loe. cit. 
21 British mediation and r ela tions vnth t he United Provinces 
are discussed in more detail i n Chapter V. 
12 
and Great Britain had considerable pm~er there, while the United 
States had very little. The United Provlnces continued to obtain 
aid from the United States , and more than once the vision of the 
advantage to .American industry of a treaty of commerce was presented 
to United States agents. 22 
Miller was replaced as consul at Buenos Aires by Thomas L. 
Halsey. He was appointed on July 18, 1812, and arrived in Buenos 
Aires on August 30, 1812.23 Like too many American representatives 
in South Alnerica, Halsey became over active in the political affairs 
of the United Provinces and eventually was recalled because of his 
actions. 
Through his reports, Halsey kept the United States govern-
ment informed on the activities of the United Provinces. It was 
Halsey who was consul when the independence of t he United Provinces 
was announced. He received formal notificati on of this from the 
United Provinces government on July 19, 1816, ten days after it was 
passed by t he Cong-ress of Tucurn~. 24 He forwarded this information 
to the State Department on July 24, 1816. 
22 Gervasio Posadas to President 11a.dison, March 9, 1811.i., 
MS. Notes from the Argentine Legation, I, 1. 
23 John P. Harrison, 912.. cit. 
24 Halsey to Monroe, July 24, 1816, MS. Despatches from 
United States Consuls in Buenos Aires, I, 1. A copy of this declar-
ation is found in the appendix. ---
13 
While this news was welcome in the United States, it did not 
come -as a surprise. Secretary of State Monroe rurl been notified of 
the intention of the United Provinces by a note from Supreme Di rector 
Alvarez on January 16, 1816. 
When this letter reaches your Ex:cellency, the General 
Congress of our Representatives ,rill have met, and I can assure 
you, without fear of being mistaken, that one of its first 
acts wi l l be a solemn Declaration of Independence of these 
Provinces of t he Spanish Monarchy and of all other Foreign 
Sovereigns or Pm~ers.25 
With the return of Poinsett to the United States in 1815, 
ther e existed a pressing need for representation in l a Plata. On 
January 12, 1816, Colonel Joseph Devereux was appoint ed as an 
agent to that area. Devereux was going to South Ameri ca on business, 
so he was given a position similar to that of Poinsett 1s original 
appointrnent.26 It was expected that Devereux would serve as agent 
for some time, but as will be expl ained later, he also exceeded 
his powers and was ~ecalled. 
Devereux had taken an intense interest in the problems of 
the United Provinces, especially the financi al needs. This int erest 
led him to propose a loan of $2, 000 , 000 t o the United Provinces, 
which was to be guaranteed by the United States government. 27 The 
25 Manning, EE•.£!!:•, II, 342. Alvarez to Madison, 
January 16, 1816. 
26 Wriston, _2£. cit. , 414. 
27 See the appendix for a copy of the text of this loan. 
The money was to be used by the United Provinces a gent Manuel 
Aguirre during his vi.sit to the United States. The mission of 
Aguirre is discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
14 
United States consul, Thomas Halsey , who had played a part in bring-
ing Devereux and Pueyrred6n together, also signed the treaty.28 
Needless to say, as soon as these negotiations were learned in 
Washington, the appointment of Devereux was wi thdravm. Devereux' s 
successor, William G.D. Worthington, was appointed Special Agent 
f>or Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru on January 23, 1817. 29 
Worthington arr ived in Buenos Aires on September 5, 1817, 
and was received by the Supreme Di r ector Pueyrreddn on September 
13, 1817.30 One of the first actions of ·worthington was t o explain 
t he United States action in ref using the loan arranged by Devereux. 
In turn, it was explained to Worthington t hat the proposal for a 
loan came first from Devereux.31 Worthington spent much of his 
time the remaining months of 1817 becoming versed on the gover nment 
and conditions ,vi.thin the United Provinces and at the same time 
going to great lengths to review with the government of the United 
Provinces, conditions within the United St ates and t he present s t ate 
of her foreign policy.32 
28 Pueyrredcfu to President Madison, January 31, 1817, MS. 
Notes from the Argentine Legation. 
29 Wriston, op. cit., 415 . 
30 State Department, MS. Despatches f rom United States 
Ministers to Argentina, I, 1. Letter from w. G.D. Worthington to 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams , October 1 , 1817. 
3l Loe. cit. - --
32 Worthington to Secretary of State of the United Provin-
ces, Gregorio Tagle, October 30, 1817, MS . Despatches from United 
States Ministers~ Argentina. -
15 
January, 1818, brought troubles once again With American 
representatives in South America. On Januar-J 7, 1818, Worthington 
was informeµ that the government had ordered the United States 
consul, Thomas Halsey, to leave the city of Buenos Aires and board 
a ship in the harbor. The charges against him concerned bis vi sit 
to General Artigas, one of the enemy forces, the beli ef that he had 
a part in receiving hostile papers from Baltimore, and his acti ons 
in i ssuing commissions and in general interfering in the privateering 
syst em of the United Provinces.33 Worthington met with Halsey and 
advised him to protest and then ask that his passport be f orv,arded 
t o him within twenty-four hours. 'I\vo days later, January 9, t he 
order against ~ y was suddenly r emoved .34 Needless to say, the 
usefulness of Halsey as a consul was brought t o an end with this 
incident. 
At the same time this incident was taking place, of ficials 
in Washington were preparing for the di smi ssal of Halsey . His re-
moval from office was sent to him under the date of January 22, 
1818 .35 After receiving this, Halsey remai ned in Buenos Aires f or 
a time, and after turning over several despatches to John Gr aham, 
one of the three speci al commissioners from t he United Stat es, he 
returned to the United States.36 
33 . Ibid., Worthi ngt on to Adams, January 10, 1818. 
34 Loe. cit. -.- --
35 Paxson, .2.E• cit., 116, 153. 
36 Halsey to Etraham, August 21, 1818, MS . Despatches from 
United States Consuls in Buenos Aires. 
16 
Worthington was the next agent to become involved in the 
politics of Buenos Aires. His mission was ended when he negotiated 
a treaty with the United Pr oVinces which actually amounted to a 
general commercial and amity treaty. 
Information to explain Worthington's acti ons seems to be 
lacking.. The only reason given was that he "thought it necessary 
to do something for our safety and to w·atch our interests. 11 37 He 
admitted to the United Province government that he did not 11pretend 
to be _clothed with any Treaty mal<:ing powers or s pecific instruc-
tion. • •• 11 38 Worthington was confident that approval 1vould be 
fort hcoming from the United States for his actions. Some question 
might be raised as to~ eyrred<fu conti nued the ne gotiations 
after learning this, but as yet, this question can not be ansvrered. 
The treaty was signed on January 1, 1818, by Worthington and 
Doctor Julian Alverez. Article Eighteen, the one whi-ch was to pre-
cipitate considerable correspondence between Secretary of State 
Adams and David C. De Forest, read as follows: 
Consuls, Vice Consuls, Commercial Agents & Vice Commercial 
Agents may reside in either count ry and enjoy all the right s 
& privileges belonging to them by reason of their functions . 39 
37 Worthington to Adams, January 1, 1818, MS . Despatches 
from United States Ministers in Argentina. 
38 Ibid., Worthington to Tagle, December 12, 1817. 
39 Project signed by Worthington and Alverez, January 1, 
1818, MS. Despatches from United States Ministers in Argentina. 
The mission of De Forest is discussed in Chapter III. 
17 
Upon learning of Worthington's actions, Adams is reported 
to have spoken of the agent as having 11broken out into a self-
accredited Plenipotentiary. 11 40 Worthington's dismissal w-as dated 
February 25, 1819; but he remained in South America for a short time 
after this. His last correspondence, dated March 7, 1819, gives a 
general summarization of his activities in South America and t he 
condition of the United Provinces.41 
At this point in the studyof American agent s in l a Plata 
region, it i s necessary to turn back to 1817. With t he July 9, 
/ 1816, q.Ilnouncement of the Congress of Tucuman, and the failure -of American agents to secure the information desired by the admi n-
istration, President Monroe decided to send a spec ial agent to the 
South for study of the revolting provinces. His first thought was 
of Joel Poinsett, and on April 25, 1817, he addressed a letter to 
Poinsett asking him ·to undertake the mission. He was to make t he 
trip in a public ship, and liberal compensat ion was assured h:i.m .42 
Since Poinsett was serving in the South Carolina l egislature, he 
declined the appointment.43 
40 Writson, op . cit., 421. 
41 Worthington to Adams , March 7, 1819, MS. Despa tches from 
United States Ministers to Argentina. 
42 Manning, op. cit., I, 39-40 . Monroe to Poinsett, April 
25, 1817. 
43 Paxson, op. cit., 120. 
18 
With Poinset~ts refusal, the President decided to send a 
commission instead of one man. Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham 
were selected for the job, and acting Secretary of State Richard 
Rush prepared t heir orders under the date of July 18, 1817.44 It 
was intended for these men to leave immediately, but fate decided 
otherwise. Rodney was detained because of the sickness of his son, 
and i.vith the President on a tour of New England and the West, the 
plan was dropped until his return in September .45 
With the return of the President, plans were resumed and 
another commissioner and a secretary were appointed. Theodorick 
Bland was the third commissioner , and H. M. Brackenridge was appointr-
ed secretary.46 New instructi ons were sent to the commissioners , 
.but the main plan was to follow the original i nstructions of July 
18, 1817.47 The commissioners sailed on the frigate Congress, on 
December 3, 1817, and it was expected that they would be gone seven 
or eight months.48 
44 Manning, op. cit., I, 40-45. Adams to Graham and 
Rodney, July 18, 1817:- D"'ct:racts of these instructions 1vill be 
fom1d in the appendix. 
45 Paxson,~- cit., 120. 
46 Ibid., 121. 
47 Manning, op. cit., I, 47-49. Adams to Rodney , Graham 
and Bland, November 21, i817. Extracts of these instructions will 
be found in the appendix. 
48 H. M. Brackenridge, Voyage to South .America (Baltimore: 
H. :M. Brackenridge, 1819), I, 101. 
19 
With the departure of the commissioners , recognition of the 
South A.merican provinces became of world-wide :importance. In the 
United States House of Representatives, Henry Clay began a campaign 
for t heir immediate recognition--a move which was to cause consid-
erable uneasiness for the President and the Secretary of State . 
Adams speal<:s of Clay mounting "his South American great horse ... 
[ in his effort] to control or overthrow the Executive by swaying 
the House of Representatives. 11 49 
Europe also took considerable i nterest in t he mission of t he 
American commissioners. Since their real purpose had not been made 
public, Spain and Great Britain immediately had t he fear t hat t heir 
immediate objective was formal recognition of Buenos Aires and the 
surrounding territory. Spain opposed becaus_e of the loss of her 
slim hope of regaining the provinces, while Great Britain was uneasy 
because of t he damage recognition could have to her trade with South 
America.SO 
The commissioners arrived i n Buenos Aires on February 28, 
1818 . 51 They were welcomed by represent atives of t he government 
with a great sh01~ of formalities. Considerable interest had been 
shown by the residents as well as t he government as to the exact 
purpose of this mission. Because of the public nature of t heir 
49 Paxson, EE• cit., 127. Clay's actions in t he House 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter V. 
50 British and Spanish opini on on this mission will be 
discussed again in Chapter V. 
51 Brackenridge, op . •cit., I, 101. 
20 
mission and the attention that had been attracted to it, the com-
missioners were unable to learn much but what had already been 
reported. For the most part, they had to accept the information 
that was presented to them. In this respect, a single commissioner, 
sent without all the fanfare wh.ich accompanied the three men and 
t heir party, could probably have accomplished much more. The com-
missioners' retur n to the United States was announced to the Presi-
dent on July 30, 1818, by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. 
Rodney and Graham returned at this time , but Bland remained in 
South America and traveled on to Chile befor e his return. 52 
The reports of the commissioners re-affirmed what the govern-
ment already !mew, rather than gaini ng any new information of great 
importance. The essence of t he reports was that it appeared to be 
impossible for Spain to regain control of South America, but on the 
other hand, some doubt existed as to the ability of t he governments 
of South America to maintain a stable government. Of particular 
interest to the commissioners was the importance of British imports 
to Buenos Aires. The most important result of the vi sit to the South 
American governments was the new strength it gave to the cause of 
independence and t he stabi lity it gave to t he existing governments. 53 
1818. 
52 Manning,,££• cit., I, 74 . Adams to Monroe, July 30, 
53 Manning,.££· cit., I, 382-439, 486-495, 495-515. 
Bland to Adams, November 2, 1818; Graham to Adams, November 4, 1818; 
Rodney to Adams, November 5, 1818. 
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The recall of Worthington in February, 1819, had left only 
John Prevost representing the United States in the southern part of 
South .America. He had been appointed as an agent for Chile and Peru 
on July 12, 1817, and on May 3, 1819, after the dismissal of vorth-
ington and Halsey, Buenos Aires was added to his sphere of activi-
ties. 54 The slovmess of travel and communications and the large 
territory he was to cover made it necessar;T for the United States 
to have an agent in the eastern part of lower South .America. Also, 
the increasing violations of .American neutral rights by South .Amer-
i can privateers made it necessary to have better representation. 
In apPointing someone to carry out this mission, President 
Monroe attempted to use a new type of agent. In a note to Secretary 
of Navy, Smith Thompson, on May 20, 1819, instructions were included 
for Captain Oliver H. Perry to go to Buenos Aires to explain the 
President's views on recognition and attempt to settle diffi culties 
ari sing out of neutrality. He was to appear as a commander of an 
.American ship and not as a special a gerit, and he was expected to stay 
not longer than one month.55 Because of the death of Perry before 
he reached Buenos Aires, these orders were transferred to Commodore 
Richard Morris, who in turn visited Buenos Aires. Morris viras there 
for only a short t i me, and it was during the revolutions of 1819 and 
1820, so his mission accomplished little.56 
54 Wriston, -2:e• cit., 419. Paxson, op . cit., 152. 
55 Manning, ~- cit., I, 102. Adams to Thompson, May 20 , 1819. 
56 Ibid., I, 540-41. Prevost to Adams, February 24, 1820. 
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With the failure of Morris, President Monroe was once again 
ready to appoint a resident agent for Buenos Aires. For this job, 
I 
John M. Forbes was chosen. Forbes' orders, dated July 5, 1820, 
instructed him. to report on both internal and external commerce, 
protest concerning rules of privateering and also to keep the United 
States well informed on the political development of the area. He 
was given commissions for both Buenos Aires a.rd.Chile, with the under-
standing that he was to take the post Prevost did not want.57 
Forbes left the United States on July 25, 1820, and arri ved 
in Buenos Aires on October 24, 1820.58 He found a situation similar 
to t hat faced by Worthington, in that an American diplomat had been 
ordered from the country. The government had taken offense at some 
statements Prevost had made to the State Department, and had l ater 
appeared in. American newspapers. Prevost was given four days to be 
out of Buenos Aires, and Forbes arrived on t he third day.59 Thus, 
t here was no question remaining as to which post Prevost would 
choose. Prevost remained in the Buenos Aires harbor on board a 
United Sta tes vessel until October, 1820, when he boarded a British 
ship and sailed for Chile. 
57 Ibid., 130-31. Adams to Forbes. July 5, 1820 . 
Forbes had served the United States as a diplomat in Eur0pe and 
thus was the first of any distinction to appear at Buenos Aires. 
58 Stewart Watt, 11 The Diplomatic Service of John M. 
Forbes at Buenos Aires," Hispanic American Historical Review, XI V 
(May, 1934), 203. 
59 Forbes to Adams, December 4, 1820, MS. Despatches from 
United States Consuls, I, 2. 
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The arrivaJ. of Forbes found the internal condition of Buenos 
Aires critical. Pueyrredtz.i had been forced into exile and a series 
of dictatorships followed in rapid succession. Many of the citizens 
were disappointed in the failure of Forbes to bring recognition. 
Some of these people believed he had the power to recognize the United 
Provinces, but was withholding this action. Others believed his 
only purpose was to collect debts from citizens, and of course this 
belief didn't strengthen his popularity in that area. Many of these 
rumors were attributed by Forbes to Aguirre and other agents as a 
means of covering up for t heir own defeats or failures in the United 
States.60 Despite these attempts to discredit him, and other att empts 
to draw him into party politi cs, he remained neutral and kept his name 
clear of any scandal. 
More than once, these attempts to obtain his official 
approval for a cer tain political party took the form of physical 
force. His answer to these groups is a good indication of his 
position. 
I am neither authorized or disposed to enlist in any of the 
parties which unfortunat ely exist in this country. I wish the 
South .Americans every possible happiness, but cannot undertake 
to instruct them as to the means of attaining it.61 
Forbes run into more trouble when he attempted to secure 
the release of American ships that had been taken as pr i zes of war 
6o Forbes to Adams, December 4, 1820. MS . Despatches from 
United States Consuls, I, 2. 
61 Loe. cit. 
24 
by privateers commissioned by Buenos Aires. On February 26, 1821, 
he secured the release of an .American schooner, but at the same 
time was notified that in the future he would correspond with t he 
government only by representation.62 On March 1, 1821, Forbes asked 
for his passport. On March 9, he met, on request, vii th an official 
of the goverrnnent. At this meeting Forbes expl ained his reas ons for 
requesting his passport. He stated t bat such action removed all of 
his diplomatic character, and t her efore he woul d leave t he country 
until s t able government was again established. Apologi es were of fer-
ed f or t he action of the government and the order requiring him to 
use the representation method was removect.63 
Forbes waited until a new government, t he Republic of 
Buenos Aires, had been formed in July, 1821, wi.th Bernardo Riva-
davia as Ifinister of Foreign Relat i ons, before presenting the Uni ted 
States demands concerning privateering. His first note to Riva-
davia was on September 14, 1821. This was followed by a conference 
on September 17. On October 6, 1821, Forbes was presented wi t h a 
copy of a decree issued by the Depar.tment of War and Marine, which 
recognized t he posi tion of the United Sta tes concerni ng t he recall-
ing of all privateer's sailing under the Buenos Ai res f l ag and 
62 Forbes to Adams, March 10, 1821, MS. Despatches from 
United States Consuls, I, 2. The term 11 r epresentation11 meant on 
special stamped paper, which was t he method used by ordinary 
citizens in corresponding with the government. 
63 Loe. cit. 
revoking their commissions .64 This government, in which Rivadavia 
played a leading part, established an orderly government and once 
again the area around Buenos Aires became comparatively peaceful. 
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With the establishment of orderly goverrnnent in Buenos Aires, 
The United States was giving serious thought to recognition. Europeru1 
affairs were favoring .llme r ica in regard to South America, and the 
United States and Spain had rati fied the treaty ceding Florida to 
the United States. Formal r ecormnendation for recognition came in 
Monroe's address t o Congress on March 8, 1822~65 This subject was 
debated in Congress , and on May 4, 1822 , Monroe signed a bill to 
appropriate $100, 000 for t he cost of sending missions to the new 
nations in America.66 
The first Hispanic American state to be recognized was 
Colombia, on June 19, 1822, when Secretary of State Adams pre-
sented Manuel Torres to President Monroe as charge d 1affaires fro m 
Colombia.67 Formal recognition of Buenos Aires came on January 27, 
1823, with the approval by the Senate of Caesar A. Rodney as minister 
64 A copy of the decree and the correspondence exchanged 
by Forbes and Rivadavla is found in American St ate Papers; Foreign 
Relations, IV, 2l4. 
65 American State ~ers, Foreign Relations, IV, 818-19 . 
66 Annals of Congress, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 2603-04 . 
67 William Spence Robertson, "The Recognition of t he His-
panic American Nations by the United States," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, I (August, 1918), 259. 
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plenipotentiary.68 John Forbes, who was the American agent in 
Buenos Aires at the time of recognition, became secretary of t he 
United States legation and l ater charge ~'affaires. The recognition 
of Buenos Aires was completed on October 7, 1824, when President 
¥onroe received General Carlos Alvear as Ar gentine Minister . 69 
68 Ibid., 261. His name was submitted to the Senate on 
January 13, 1823. 
69 Samuel Flagg Bemis, "Early Diplomatic Missions from 
Buenos Aires to the United States, 1811-1824, 11 Proceedings of the 
.American Antiquarian Society, New Series, XLIX (April 19, 1939:--
0ctober 18, 1939), 94. 
CHAPTER III 
AGENTS FROM THE UNITED PROVINCES TO THE UNITED STATES 
The first representative from Buenos Aires to the United 
States was not appointed until after the July 9, 1816, declaration 
of independence, but this does not mean agents of the Buenos Aires 
government had not put in an appearance at Washingt on before this. 
Several of the· provinces revolting against Spain were represented 
unofficially by citizens of the United States . 
Like most groups in ·revolt, one of the first necess ities 
of Buenos Aires was an adequate supply of arms. The governing 
junta first made its appeal to Great Britain, but this appeal 
went unansvrnred . This action was t aken by the British because t hei r 
primary object at this time was to help the Spanish nationalists in 
their fi ght against Napoleon .l On J e 6, 1811, the governing 
junta of Buenos Aires addressed a lett er to President Madison, 
explaining that Don Diego Saavedra and Don Juan de Aguirre were being 
sent secretly and under assumed names to purchase military supplies 
ill the United States. 2 The reason for t he s ecrecy can be explained 
in part by the fear of Great Britain . Poinsett stated that the 
1 Samuel Flagg Bemis, 11 Early Diplomatic Missions from Buenos 
Aires to the United States, 1811-1824," Proceedings of the Ameri can 
Anti1uarian Society, New Sewies, XLIX (April 19, 1939-October 18, 1939, 11-12 . 
2 State Department, MS. Notes from the Argentine Legation, 
I, 1. Letter from Cornelio deSaavedra and others to President 
Madison, June 6, 1811. 
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officials feared, distrusted, yet courted Great Britain. He believed 
that they desired 11 to retain the friendship of the United States, 
[but] dared not arouse British opposition. 11 3 
Although the correspondence between the United Provinces and 
the United States made mention of the establishment of comnercial 
relations, the main purpose of the two men was to secure aid . It 
was hoped t hese agents would be able to obtain 8, 000 swords, 10, 000 
guns with cartridges, and l,000,000 flints for carbines and pistols.4 
The junta had requested the United States government to fur-
nish these envoys with assistance and protection.5 They were not 
given direct government aid in the United States, but they were 
allowed to work freely. Because of the l ack of funds and the unre-
liability of Argentine credit, the agents were unable to obtain all 
the supplies they had been sent for. They finally shipped 1,000 
muskets and 362,000 flints.6 The mission of these agents did much 
to Cr'Jstallize a policy for Madison. Although there was no plan for 
formal recognition in the near future, the policy of the encouragement 
of recognition by other powers was started by the United Sta.tes.7 
3 J. Fred Ruppy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University. Press, 1935 ), 40. 
4 Bemis,~- cit., 18. 
5 Saavedra to Jefferson, June 6, 1811, MS. Notes from the 
Argentine Legation. These agents held no diplomatic rank, therefore 
the protection they asked for could not be granted. In carrying 
out their mission, they were required to act as private citi zens. 
6 
7 
Bemis, SE· cit., 23. 
Ibid., 24. 
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When these supplies reached Buenos Aires on May 19, 1Bl2, 
there was great enthusiasm expressed. W. G. Miller, United States 
consul at Buenos Aires, writes that after the arrival of the supplies 
11 the U. S . are looked up to as the only sincere friends of their cause 
not only by t he Goverrnnent but by the people. 11 8 
It was to be another f our years before an official represent-
ative of the United Provinces would be unof f icially accepted by the 
United States. However, during ti~at time considerable correspondence 
passed between t he t wo states, and more t han once Buenos Aires business-
men served as an unofficial r epresentative of his government while 
in t he United States on business . 
/ Colonel Don Mar tin Thompson was appointed as a secret agent 
of Buenos Aires to go to the United States early in January, 1816. 
Ignacio Alvarez, the head of the government , informed the President 
of the United States of t his appointment by a despatch dat ed January 
16, 1816. 9 The reason for the secrecy of this mission was later 
explained by Pueyrredon as being necessary because of "the suspicion 
that might otherwise have arisen concerni ng its object. 11 10 This 
seems to indicate that fear of Europe, e&pecially Great Britain, 
still existed at th.is time in Buenos Aires . 
8 State Department, MS . Despatches from United States 
Consuls in Buenos Aires, I, 1. Letter from Miller to Secretary of 
State Monroe, July~l812. 
9 Pueyrredd'n to Monroe, January 1, 1817, MS. 
the Argentine Legation. 
lO Loe. cit. 
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The purpose of Thompson's mission was to obtain any fonn of 
material assistance, and even to try to get American government 
officers to go to Buenos Aires.11 He arrived in New York on May 3, 
1816, but contrary to diplomatic proceedure, di d not immediately 
depart for the seat of government at Washington. While in New York, 
he contracted with several French and Polish officers to serve in 
Buenos Aires, and speculated on the use of a steamship which he had 
seen demonstrated. While not enga ged in this f ascination, he sent 
despatches to Buenos Aires demanding more money and a hi gher positi on. 
He started his journey to Washington in November, 1816, but bef ore 
appearing begore the government, he wrote once again to Buenos 
Aires demanding a rank as a public agent.12 
By t he time these latest demands had reached Buenos Aires, 
Pueyrredon had ordered Thompson removed from office. The mai n reasons 
for his r emoval were that he had made contracts with foreign offi cers 
and t he granting of privateering commissions, which hai been causing 
the United States so much trouble.13 All of these acts had been 
carried out before he had appeared in Washi ngton. Fis l etter of 
di smissal bluntly informed him 11 t ha t it vrnuld not be necessary- for 
h:iln to return to Buenos Aires. 11 J..4 
11 Bemis, £"£· cit., 43 . 
12 Ibid., 45. 
13 Ibid., 46~ 
14 Ibid., 47. 
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The dismissal of Thompson brings to the scene the best lmovm 
of those early agents from Buenos Aires--Don Manuel Hermenej~ldo de 
Aguirre . He was appointed in March, 1817, and President Monroe was 
notified of his appointment by a despatch dated March 28, 1817.15 
He was to serve as an "agent of this [United Provinces] Gaivernment 
near that of the Uni ted States •.•• " and was granted such 11priv-
ileges, pregeminencies and prerogatives which belong to the said 
title."16 This last phrase hints at ms having diplomatic character, 
but neither his commis sion nor any of his orders delegated him any 
power as a public minister or any power to negotiate as such .17 Besides 
his appearance as a public agent from t he Uni ted Provi nces, he also 
held a commission as a private agent from Chi le.18 
The primary purpose of Agui rre's mis s ion was the purchase of 
ships. Just before ms appointment, San Martin had returned t o Buenos 
, I 
Aires from Chile , and Pueyrredon joined him in his plan for a naval 
fleet and army to liberate Peru . Agui rre, with Gregario G6mez, ms 
assistant,~sailed from Buenos Aires late in May , 1817 . He presented 
his credentials to Secretary of State Ada.rns on October 29 , 1817. He 
was not formall y received by the President a s to do so would have been 
a sign of the r ecognition of the government t hat appointed him.19 
15 Pueyrredcfn to Monroe , March 28, 1817, MS. Notes from 
the Argentine Legation . 
16 Loe . cit., leaving the U. S . with t he decis ion as t o the 
actual position of the agent. 
17 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 173 , 
18 Loe . cit. 
19 Bemis, .9£• cit., 50, 59. 
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On meeting with the Secretary of State, Aguirre explained his 
mission, stating that he desired to purchase two 34 gun fri gates and 
as many other warships as he could obtain.20 He was informed by Adams 
that he was free to purchase ships of any size from private indivi-
duals, but that he must not equip them in any way for war within the 
boundaries of the United States. He was promised protection as long 
as he remained vrithin these limits.21 Shortly after this meeting, he 
contracted for the building of the bvo frigates in New York for the 
price of 200,000 pesos . This contract soon became public, and as 
eA-pected, a protest was sent to the State Department by the Spanish 
consul. 
The conference between Aguirre and Adams on December 16, 1817, 
is one of the most important of this period. At this meeting Aguirre 
asked for the recognition of the United Provinces as an independent 
state.22 Up to this time, he had off ered every opportunity to be 
recognized, but had not demanded it. None of his credenti als or 
orders instructed him to take t hi s action, but the actions of Clay 
and the friendlL~ess of Adams probably lead him to believe t hat the 
general terms could be interpreted to give him this power.23 
20 Ibid., 50. He did not inform Adams that he carri ed 
twenty-five blank commissions from Buenos Aires and also t he same 
number from Chile. It must be remembered tbat t his was one of the 
reasons for the removal of Thompson at an earlier date. 
21 Ibid., 55. 
22 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 180. 
23 Bemis,~- cit., 64 . 
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Undoubtedly much of the encouragement for this move came from 
within the United States. This was dur:ing the :p3 riod that Clay was 
making his demands in Congress f or recogniti on, and Aguirre probably 
felt that his demands , plus those of Clay, mi ght be strong enough 
to force the issue of recognition. He failed to under stand the posi-
tion of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs . 
If Aguirre had dropped the matter after this refusal, 
his usefulness as an agent might have remained. Instead of following 
this course, Aguirre attempt ed to force the recognition by a series 
of questions , demands , and threats that only ruined all chance for 
the recognition of his country at this time. On December 29, 1817, 
Aguirre entered a complaint on the neutrality laws of March 3, 1816.24 
On January 6, 1818, he stated that although not definitely authorized 
to enter into a treaty, he would 
have not the least hesitation to assure you that I consider 
myself fully authorized by my Government to enter into a ne-
gotiation with that of the United States on the general basis 
of a reciprocal amity and commerce [treatyJ. 25 
On January 16, 1818, Aguirre reminded Adams that the ports of the 
United Provinces were open to foreign states only by decree, and that 
24 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 182. This 
law prohibited the fitting out of vessels similar to t hose purchased 
by Aguirre, and provided for confiscation by the director of customs, 
a fine of $10,000 and a prison sentence of not more than ten years 
for the owner or person contracting for the construction of such ships . 
25 William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American 
Nations (New Yor k : Oxford University Press, 192~ 367. Letter 
from Aguirre to Secretary of State Adams, January 6, 1818. 
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they could be closed to the United States very easily.26 Adams ansvr-
ered this threat by reminding Aguirre that the ports of the United 
States could be closed to all ships from t he Uni ted Provinces jus t 
as easily.27 
Despite t hese actions of Aguirre , Adams remained fairly calm . 
During a conference on March 25, 1818, Adams asked as to the method 
of recognition and the territory to be included i n the United Provinces. 
He observed that the United States was recognized by France by a t reaty 
naming each state, and t hat something similar mi ght be necessary, 
mainly t o form an idea of the general extent of the country. Aguirre 
an~ffered t hat the United Provinces should be the old viceroyalty of 
la Plata . This included Montevideo, land held by the Portuguese , and 
land held by General Artigas , but that all of this would probably 
soon become part of Buenos Aires. 28 
During the months since Aguirre's first demand for recognition, 
Clay 1s movement in the House f or r ecognition had been gaining momen-
tum. On March 24, 1818, he had introduced an amendment to an appro-
priati on bill for $18, 000 to provide for a minister to the United 
Provinces . 29 The i ssue came to a vote on March 28 , but Clay 's 
1818 . 
26 .American State Papers , Forei gn Relations, IV, 183 . 
27 Bemis, op. cit., 64. 
28 Manning, .£1?.• cit., 59-60 . Adams to Monroe, March 25, 
29 _Annals of Congress, 15th Congress , 1st Session, 1468. 
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speechrna.king was not enough to save it from an inglorious 115 t o 45 
defeat. 30 
No doubt this movement of f ered Aguirre assur ances of quick 
recogniti on, but Clay's defeat, plus a l etter from Pueyrred5n on t he 
day after the vote in the House, brought Aguirre's diplomatic house 
of cards down with a loud crash. This note from Pueyrred6n was the 
first formal request for r ecogniti on, and of course it made i t evident 
that Agui r re had no justificati on f or any of t he demands or r epr e-
sentat ions he had been mald ng. Pueyrredo'ri explained that the request 
had not come sooner because he did not want "to engage other nations 
to compromise their interests by any formal ac knowledgment while 
independence remai ned doubtful. 11 31 Aguirre I s unauthorized conduct 
had just secur ed the rej ection of the request wh i ch his government 
had now author i zed him to make . He did not r ematn in Washington 
long enough to present this let ter to t he gover nment , .but mailed it 
to the Secretary of St ate fr om New Yor k. 32 
When he.._ reached New York , he learned t hat his t roubl es wer e 
far from over . He attempted to get t he ships he had or dered, but t his 
was ref used because of his lack of money . He sent his ass istant, 
G6mez, to Buenos Ai res to obtain funds , and in the meantime Aguirr e 
was arrested and spent four days in j ail charged wi t h vi olat ion of 
t he neutrality laws. When Gdme.z: di d not re turn, Aguirre rai sed 
30 Ibid., 1646 
31 Bemis, op. 9it., 66. 
32 Ibid., 67. 
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enough money on notes payable on arrival in Buenos Aires to get the 
ships released. He sailed from New York early in September, 1818, 
with his tviro vessels, the Curiacio and the Horatio, but only one was 
destined to enter the service of Buenos Aires. The Curiacio later 
sailed for Buenos Aires as t he Independencia, but when the Horatio 
was not paid for in Buenos Aires, the captain sailed for Rio de 
Janeiro and sold it to the Portuguese. 33 
Even before Aguirre left fashington, the government of the 
United Provinces had a desire for better representation in t he United 
States. On February 25, 1818, they appointed David C. De Forest, an 
American businessman who lived in Buenos Aires, as consul general, and 
William H. Winder, a Baltimore lawyer who had defended Buenos Aires 
pirates in United States courts, as a special deputy. 34 Winder 
talked with President Monroe, who was a personal friend, and Monroe 
encouraged him to take the appointment. Nevertheless, he declined, 
stating t hat he felt De Forest was a more able man and that he woul d 
aid him in every way possible. 35 
David De Forest was appointed consul gener al under t he t erms 
of the treaty that had been negotiated by Wor thington in January, 1818. 
33 Ibid., 70-74. After returning to Buenos Aires, Aguirre 
put in claims with the Uni ted Provinces and Chile for 52 , 098 pesos 
as salary and expenses while in the United States. Ar gentina finally 
paid him 24,730 pesos in 1833 and charged it up to Chile . Chile 
examined his accounts and ended up by claiming tha t Aguirre owed them 
89 , 937 pesosl 
34 Ibid., See pa ges 77-84 f or more details about Winder. 
35 Ibid . , 83. 
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President Monroe was notified of this appointment by a despatch dated 
May, 1818.36 Mr. De Forest first met with Secretary of State Adams 
on May 7, 1818, and at this time was informed that the United States 
could not recognize him . After this meeting, he had an unofficial 
conference with the President, but he did not ask for recognition. 
In refusing to grant an exequatur to De Forest, Adams estab-
lished the principle that such action is actually a recognition of 
the authority making the appointment.38 It was also pointed out that 
De Forest 's commission was based upon the Worthington treaty, which 
the United States had never authorized or considered valid. 
At first, De Forest appeared to be satisfied t o serve as 
agent, but with the meeting of Congress, he again made a demand for 
recognition as a consul on December 4, 1818. In this note he att~npted 
to point out that the United States was not follm~ing their policy of 
placing Spain and the colonies on an equal footing . In this respect 
he brought out the favorable position of the Spanish consul in our 
courts compared to the limitation in this respect placed upon an 
ordinary agent, such as those from South A..merica. 39 Once again, Adams 
36 Manning,~- cit., I, 377-78. This despatch is dated 
May(?), 1818, but was probably received by the President sometime 
between May 5 - 10, 1818. 
37 Bemis, E.E.· cit., 85-86. 
38 John Bassett Moore,! Digest of International Law 
(Washington: Government Printing Office , 1906), I, 79. An exequatur 
is a written authorization of a consular officer, by the government 
to which he is accredited. 
39 De Forest to Adams, December 9, 1818, MS . 
the Argentine Legation. 
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maintained the stand he had taken earlier in the year upon the effect 
of recognition of a consul such as De Forest. 
In answer to a request made by the House of Representatives 
on January lh, 1819, for information on South America, part of the 
correspondence of De Forest was sent for study .40 Upon hearing this, 
De Forest once again became acti ve in his requests for recognition. 
By this time it had become apparent t o Adams and Monroe that De Forest 
was working with the opposition in Congress . Ada.ms reminded him that 
he was still a United States citizen, and as such could be prosecuted 
under the neutrality laws for his work in privateering.41 Mr. De 
Forest took the hint and did not continue his demands for r ecognition.42 
By May, 1822, it had become apparent that the recognition of 
t he South American governments would soon bec ome a reality . A request 
was made by De Forest for Buenos Aires to be the first state to be 
recognized, with him as charge ~'aff aires and consul general. 43 Adams 
r eplied to his request on May 23, 1822 , informing him once a gain that 
he could not be accepted. Adams based this action on a number of 
reasons. First, De Forest's commission was not considered valid 
40 Manning, EE· cit., I, 73, Adams to Monroe, January 14, 1819. 
41 Part of De Forest's orders were to encourage privateering 
and secure ports for t he use of privateering. De Forest had lived 
in Buenos Aires for a number of years as a businessman, and his appoint-
ment was made upon his return to the Unit ed States . At t he time of 
this appointment he was made a citi zen of Buenos Aires , 
42 Bemis, £E· cit., 91. 
43 Ibid., 93. 
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because it had been issued by a government which no longer existed. 
(The commission had been issued by Pueyrredo'n as head of the United 
Provinces of Rio de la Plata, but he had since been repl aced by 
Rivadavia as the head of the Republic of Buenos Aires.) Second, his 
commission was based upon a treaty tha t had not been authorized or 
accepted by the United States. Third, even if the first two had not 
existed, he still could not be accepted because the government of 
Buenos Aires had expressed an intention to the State Department to 
revoke all existing commissions. (This was carri ed out in 1823.) 
Fourth, the Unit ed States did not cons i der it proper to receive one 
of its own citizens in a di plomatic position, such as charge ~ 'aff aires, 
from a foreign state.44 This refusal by Adams mar ked the end of 
the De Forest mission to the United States. As promised, his com-
mission was later revoked. 
Recognition of the Republi c of Buenos Aires came less t han 
a year later. On January 27, 1823, the appointment of Casear A. 
Rodney as minister to t ~..at state was approved by the United States 
Senate. The completi on of the recognition came on October 7, 1824, 
when President Monroe received General Carlos Alvear as minister 
from the Republ ic of Buenos Aires.45 
44 Manning, 9£.• cit., I, 159-60. Adams to De Forest, May 
23, 1822. 
45 Bemis, EE. cit., 94. 
CHAPTER IV 
NEUTRALITY AND SOUTH AMERI CA 
The revolutions in South America raised the problem for the 
United States of what their diplomatic position would be with the 
colonies. By a proclamation of September 1, 1815, the United States 
proclaimed their neutrality in the aff airs to t he South and at the 
same time recognized the belliger ency of the Southern governments. l 
While this was disappointing to a few of the Latin Americans, 
it was the greatest help tha t the United States could render at that 
time. With few exceptions, it pl aced the insurgents upon t he same 
level as Spain, and in practice, i t benefi ted t hem more than it did 
the Spanish. Many Americans soon gave evidence that they wanted it 
to operate in this man;ier.2 
American neutrality was based upon t he neutralit y l aw of 
1794 . This haq been based upon the foreign policy of President 
Washington, and had contempl a ted only wars between independent states . 3 
This l aw was extremel y difficult to execute because no authority 
was given to seize vessels suspected of violating American neutral ity, 
- 1 American State Paper s , Foreign Relat ions (Washington: 
Gales and Seaton, 18~IV, 1 . 
2 Arthur Preston Whitaker , The United States and the 
Independence of Lati n America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 194ff; 195. 
3 Annals of Congress, 14th Congress, 2nd Session :Wash-
ington: Gales andSeaton, 1849), 1308-10. A copy of this law is 
found in the appendix. 
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and because .it was very incomplete in covering acts of aliens with-
in the United States . It prohibited a citizen of the United States 
from sending a warship out of the country for use of a belligerent , 
but it did not pr event t his same ci tizen from sell ing the same ship 
to a foreigner t o be used outside the United St ates .4 
American neutrality was made even more favorabl e to South 
America by an order of the Treasury Department dated July 3, 1815. 
This order admitted ships flying the flags of any of the i nsurgent 
governments to the ports of the United States . 5 As expected, the 
Spanish minister in the United States, Luis de Onis, entered a very 
vigorous protest against this ruling . 6 Onis was quite correct in 
pointing out that the l aw made it much easier for the Souther n . 
insurgents to obtai n war supplies, but the American feeling was t1at 
it was only II strict and impartial neutrality" which was "penni t-
ting both parties access to the ports of t he United States on equal 
tenns. 11 7 
This action of the Treasury Department made American ports 
a haven for privateers of all South American states . Use was made 
of our ports, especially New Orleans and Baltimore, to dispose of 
4 Whitaker,.££• cit., 216. 
5 John Bassett Moore,! Diges t of International Law 
(.Washington: Government Printing Office , 1906 ), I, 170. 
6 American State Papers, Foreign Relati ons, IV, L1.23 . 
Onis to Secretary of State Monroe, December 30, 1815. 
7 fuitaker, .££• cit., 119, 
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prizes and to re-arm and r ecruit new crews. lfuch of this was con-
trary to .American neutrality laws, but customs officials were usual l y 
at a loss to take acti on because of the existi ng laws. In several 
cases the courts had ruled agains t the officials and often times i t 
was extremely difficult to obtain a jury that would return a convic-
tion.8 
These flagrant violations of neutrali t y , plus t he protests 
and threats of Onis , led Monroe to propose a modification of t he 
neutrality l aw on December 26 , 1816 . The proposal s f inall y became 
l mv on March 3, 1817, but not wit hout cons i derable debate in Congress 
and the newspapers. Thi s bill was to conti nue t he same bas i c 
principles of the law of 1794, but it would give t he collectors 
cons i derably more power to det ain ships which t hey suspected as 
being used by privateers and fi t ted out contrar J to Amer i can l aws. 
One other important provi s i on was for the posting of bond by the 
owners of all ships carrying arms t hat such ships woul d not be used 
against any nation at peace with the· United St ates. 9 
Considerable t ime was spend i n debate by the Hous e on t his 
issue , and all sides and views wer e expressed . Repr esentative Erastus 
Root of New Yor k spoke agains t t he bill , and ,vit h great zeal denounced 
the 11 Tyranny of a bigotted Sover eign11 (Fer di nand). Root expr essed 
the opini on of one gr oup when he stat ed : 
8 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin A.mer i can Poli cy of t he 
United States (New York : Harcourt,-Br ace and Compa.ny;'1943)~4 . 
9 Annals of Congress, 14t h Congr ess , 2nd Sess i on, 1308-10. 
A copy of this l aw- i s f ound in the appendix. 
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The belligerent has the power of punishing offences connnit-
ted at sea; and our laws provide for the punishment of offences 
against neutrality committed in our waters. What more .•• 
could the belligerent demand?lO 
Root also attacked t he change in neutrality laws as preventing the 
South American governments from obtaining supplies in the United 
States and t hus favoring monarchy over independence. 
Representative Samuel Smith from Maryland answered Root on 
t his last charge . He stated that the mai..n pur pose was to clear the 
government of any implication in the supplying of arms. He added 
that "arms might still be exported to any extent, but in the common 
way of merchants, not by force of arms, but by swift sailing. 11 11 
One of Root's fellow citizens of New York, Grossenor, tried 
to simplify the whole question by stating that 11 it was simply a question 
whether the United States would or would not compel its citizens 
to adhere to their .duties as the people of a neutral nation. 11 12 
The bill was read for the th · d time and passed by the House 
on January 29, 1817. It l ater was returned from the Senate and with 
changes made, it became law on March 3, 1817.13 
Like most laws passed b-y Congress, the neutrality law of 
·1817 was not perfect. A law passed April 20 , 1818, att empted to 
make a policy more pleasing to those who were advocates of South 
10 Annals of Congress, 14th Congress, 2nd Session, 722 . 
11 Ibid., 724. 
12 Ibid., 727. 
13 Ibid., 767. 
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.American independence. This law of 1818 removed the provlsion of 
the act passed the previous year which permitted a foreign state 
(Spain) to increase the force of her armed ships in Unit ed States 
ports to commit hostilities against 11 a colony, distric t, or people" 
(South America). Also, the new act now permitted the arming of Amer-
ican vessels outside of the United States l imi ts, to be used against 
a power at peace with the United States .14 This ·was the method used 
by Manuel Aguirre in his attempts to obtain ships for Buenos Aires. 
This law of 1818 remained in effect t hrough the rest of the 
independence and recognition period. Other laws were passed from 
time to time, but this one of 1818 remained the basis for American 
neutrality policy. 
One of the biggest problems of American neutrality was that 
concerning privateering. This became a problem after 1815 for tvvo 
reasons. First, t he July 3, 1815 order of t he Treasury Department 
allowing ships of any flag to enter American ports encouraged South 
Americans to issue commissions for more privateers. Second, many 
privateers employed by the United St ates during the War of 1812 
and by Euro.pean powers during the Napol eonic Wars now had 11othing 
to do. Since Buenos Aires was not a ship-building country, almost 
all of their navy was composed of foreigners recruited in Buenos 
Aires ports, or more otten, in foreign ports .15 
14 Wh~taker, .2.£• cit., 246 
15 Samuel Flagg Bemis, "Early Diplomatic Missions from 
Buenos Aires to the United States, 1811-1824, 11 Proceedings of the 
American Antiquarian Society, N~N Series, XLIX (April 19, 1939 -
October 18, 1939), 47. 
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Trouble for the United States came with the recruitment and 
armament of many of these privateers in American ports. / Onis pro-
tested these unneutral acts,16 and an attempt was made to correct 
these practices by the neutrality law of M3.rch 3, 1817. 1My of the 
agents sent to the United States by Buenos Aires , as well as other 
South American governments , carried with them a supply of blank com-
missions to be issued at their pleasure. One Buenos Aires agent, 
Martin Thompson, was recalled because his activities in this respect 
became undersirable to the view of his government as well as that of 
the United States.17 
The occupation of the po.rt of Galveston and Amelia Island 
by bands of privateers brought additional ·trouble for the United 
States. These two areas were in dispute at the time as to their 
ownership by Spain and the United States, and their occu:r:ation by 
someone other than an American did not soothe the nerves of the 
administration . These was still some apprehension in the United 
States that Florida might become the property of some other European 
power, especially Britain, in return for help to Spain in regaining 
her colonies. There is evidence to prove that , while this was not 
the case, the a dventurers who occupied these two locations intended 
to establi sh a government independent of the United States .18 
16 American State Papers , Foreign Rel.a tions, IV, 182 . 0nfs 
to Secretary of State Monroe , January 2, 1817 . 
17 Bemis, 11 Farly Diplomatic Missi ons, 11 ~• cit ., 43. 
18 Annals of Congress, 15th Congress , 1st Session, 1787. 
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The establishment at Galveston was made early in 1817 by 
Commodore Louis Aury. He e$tablished his awn government and set up 
an adm:Lralty court to condemn captured vessels.19 This action was 
taken in the name of Mexico, but testimony of men who served in 
Galveston seem to discredit this. The main purpose of their enter-
prise was the capture of Spanish vessels and property, but no thought 
was given to the idea of aid to the revoluti on in Mexico, or a:ITJ' of 
the Spanish colonies in revolt. 20 It might be added that these bands 
were not interested solely in Spanish ships, but were satisfied to 
take any other nationality if the Spanish could not be found. 
Commodore Aury abandoned Galveston for Matagarda, on Spanish 
territory, on April 5, 1817 ,21 but it was only about ten days until 
Galveston was re-occupied . A group from New Orleans had taken two 
ships of supplies to Galveston, and upon finding it abandoned, decid-
ed to remain t here instead of moving on to Matagarda . 22 
At the same time a threat of a similar nature had arisen in 
'. 
East Florida. Gregor McGregor had r eceived a commission from the 
agents of Venezuela, NeiN Granada, Mexico and la Plata in the United 
States, to occupy, in t heir name, Florida. 23 This corranission had 
19 Ibid., 1790 . 
20 Ibid., 1798. Testimony of John Ducoing on October 7, 1817. 
21 Ibid., 1786. 
22 Ibid., 1796. 
23 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 415. 
A copy of McGregor's commission is found in the appendix. 
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been issued March 31, 1817, in Philadelphia, and 1mder the terms 
of the neutrality law of March 3, 1817, was illegal. The plan McGregor 
was to f ollovr vras to conquer first Amelia Island and then Florida in 
the name of the Spanish Americans, and they woul~ in turn sell this 
territory to the United States for $1,500,ooo. 2h There is some 
evidence that the State Department was informed of this, but they 
dismissed it as being so fantasti c that further cons i deration was 
unnecessary. 25 
The actions of McGregor on Amelia Island and Aury at Gal-
veston and Amelia aroused the most attention, but many others were 
involved in similar plots.26 It is inter es t i ng to note the propon-
derence of French and British names and t he almost complete lack of 
Spanish American names among these so-called agents of South America. 
McGregor made his landing on Amelia Island on June 30 , 1817, 
and in a short time had ta.lrnn control of t he i s land and established 
an i ndependent gove·rnment.27 Onis did not direct an obj ection to the 
State Department until July 9, 1817, and of course by t hat t ime it 
24 Whitaker, 912. ci t. , 237. Amelia I sland is in the mouth 
of t he St. :Mary's River, near t he boundary of Geo_rgia. 
25 Ibid., 237. The U.S. had no offici al communication with 
McGr egor, however Acti ng Secretary of Stat e Richard Rus h was informed 
of McGregor's plans by Dr. William Thornton, who was indirectly aid-
ing McGregor. Some historians are of the opinion t hat Rush met wit h 
McGregor, but a letter vrritten by Rush on May l h, 1818 , indicates 
that Rush did not deal directly uvith McGregor. 
26 Ibid., 237, and Annals of Congress, 15t h Congress, 
1st Session, 1795-97, list several other men who operated from 
these two locations. Some of the best knovm were Jean Lafitte, 
Javier Mina, and B. Lafon. 
27 American State Papers, Foreign Rela tions, IV, 18h . 
was too late for the United States to take any l egal action. Pro-
ceedings were started against him, but since he was not in the 
country, a process could not be served. 28 
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McGregor's occupation of Amelia became of immense inportance 
to the State Department because of the plans t hey had for Florida . 
This territory had been the subject of negotiations with Spain as 
indemnity for losses suffered by United States citizens, or in ex-
change for territorial claims of equal value west of t he Mississippi 
River. 29 • A threat of fore ign occupation of Flor ida had arisen in 1811 
and at this time , in a secret session, Congr ess had given President 
Madison power to take possession of any part, 11 in the event of an 
attempt to occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any 
foreign government . "30 The President was authorized to use t he Army 
and Navy in car rying this out and $100; 000 was appr onriated for his 
use in such act ion. The occupation of Galveston rais ed a similar 
problem, but this ter:ritory was claimed by th~ United States as part 
of the Louisiana Purchase. 31 
28 · Loe . cit. -- --
'29 :M' ..anning, ~ - cit ., I, 50 . 
12, 1817 . 
Monroe to Congress , .December 
30 John Bassett Moore , History and Digest of .!:_he Inter-
national Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party 
(Washington: Government Printing Office , 1898 ), IV, 3978- 80 . 
31 This dispute had arisen because of t he vagueness of t he 
boundaries defined in the original purchase . It had been understood 
that the United Stat es would receive Louisi ana just as it had been 
transferred to France. Here Spain and t he United States wer e in dis-
pute . The U. S. claimed t he Rio Grande as a boundary, while Spain 
used the western water shed of the Mississippi as her boundary . 
49 
Many of the vessels carr-Jing men and supplies to Galves ton 
were using the port of New Orleans , t herefore t he enforcement of the 
neutralit y l aws fell in part upon t he customs collector of that por t . 
Here again, the story was t he same as other ports. Evidence was hard 
to obtain, and convictions even harder. Also, the collector was 
hampered in his enforcement efforts by the lack of an adequate f orce 
or fleet of gunboats . The navy was engaged in similar activities on 
the Eastern coast and ships were just not available f or use in the 
Gulf of Mexico.32 
By October, 1817, when Spain had not taken any action to re-
move the expedition from Amelia I sland, President Monroe decided to 
take action. The Pr esident received approval f or his actions from 
hi s cabinet on October 30, 1817, and started proceedings t o move the 
army and navy into the ar ea . 33 
It was December, 1817, befo're a military and naval force could 
be dispatched to the area of Amelia Island . Captain J. D. Henley , 
commander of t he f leet, and Major James Bankhead, commander of the 
military f orce, notified Commander Aury, who by this t ime had moved 
from Mat agarda to Fernandina, the port of Amelia, and r epl aced Mc 
Gregor, t hat they would occupy the port and island i n twenty- four 




Annals of Congress, -15th Congress, lst Session, 1799-1802. 
Bemi s , "Early Di plomatic Missions , 11 ~· cit., 61. 
Annals of Congress , 15th Congress , 1st Session, 1803- 04. 
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public and private property as they found it, they would not be moles-
ted on their exit. Aury replied on the same day with great surprise 
at the action of the United States. He declared the island indepen-
dent of Spanish rule and that it belonged to Mexico.35 On the next 
day, December 23, 1817, Henley and Bankhead informed Aury that an 
American force would land that day and the use of force nmst rest with 
him. 36 Shortly after receiving this communication Aury replied that 
he was preparing to leave the island without offering resistance.37 
Thus, Monroe carried out the American tbrea t of 1811 of occupy-
ing Florida whenever it should be threatened by a foreign state . How-
ever, in this case the issue of prime importance was the disbanding of 
groups of pirates who were damaging .Amer ican shipping as well as that 
of other nations. 
This action on the part of the United States was not pleasing 
to either Spain or supporters of the ind pendence movement in the col-
onies. On{s entered a strong. protes t on December 6, 1817, lNhe..~ he 
learned of the plans being made by the President for Amelia Island. 
His protest was based upon the f a ct that both locations, Amelia and 
Galveston, were in territory still belonging to Spain . 38 Tne South 
35 ~-, 1804-05. 
36 Ibid., 1806. 
37 Loe. cit. -- --
38 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 184. 
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American propagandists made extensi ve use of this act in the .American 
press to shovr that the administrati on was against the liberty of the 
former Spanish colonies. 39 
The French also protested the .Ameri can actions on Amelia 
Island, but t heir protest was on the part Americans were taking in 
the pirate enterprises . In Adams' reply to G. Hyde de Neuville, the 
French minister, he stated that the United States had made and was 
making every effort to keep t heir citizens from taking pa.rt in these 
expeditions, but 
If in these endeavours thenJ have not been entirely successful, 
the Governments of Europe have not been more so, and among the 
occupants of Amelia Island, for the piratical purposes complained 
of in your notes, natives or Subjects of hrance have been includ-
ed no less than citizens of these States . O 
Various groups of people in the United States who were in-
terested in independence for the colonies , or were just looking for 
something to embarass the administration, 1nade good use of this action 
of the President. Claims were presented in the newspapers that the 
United States had even allied with European powers favoring the return 
of the colonies to Spain. 41 
As Monroe expected, the colonies refused to accept responsi-
bility for the acts of their agents in t he granting of commissions 
39 
40 
27 , 1818. 
Whitaker, ££· cit., 238-39 . 
Manning, ££• cit., I, 53 . 
41 Whitaker, £12.• cit., 239 . 
Adams to de Neuville , January 
to establish independent states.42 The Buenos Aires government was 
quick to disclaim all participation in the scheme. They even recalled 
their agent, Thompson, because of his activities in thi s and other 
dealings contrary to United States neutrality)t3 
The most significant aspect of the American action on Amelia 
Island was that it gave warning that the United States intended for 
Florida to be either Spanish or American, but not the property of any 
other power. It also indicated that, while the United States might 
show definite favoritism to South America, she intended to enforce, 
to the best of her ability, her neutrality laws . 
During the time that the ~~nelia I sl and i ncident was being 
/ cleaned up, Onis continued his protests against privateering out of 
American ports. He had ex~ressed gratitude for the passing of the 
neutrality law of March 3, 1817, hl~ but it soon became evident that 
t his law would not be enforced in t he manner he expe cted. On April 
5, 1817, he offered the oath of tvro Spanish seamen that the privateer 
Alme gda had robbed an English vessel on the high seas .45 Thi s shi p 
was claimed by him to have been fi t ted out in an American port. On 
July 9, 1817, he complained about the actions of .American officials 
42 Monroe had expressed this belief several t imes . His 
message to Congress on December 2, 181 7, i s one example •. 
43 
16, 1818. 
Manning, op . ci t., I, 81. Message to Congress, November 
American State Papers , Foreign Relations, IV, 189. 
on{s to Rush, I\fa.rch l~l 7. 
45 Manni.l'lg, op. cit., III, 1929 . on{s to Rush, April 5, 1817. 
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in the port of Baltimore. At this time , the Spanish consul had ob-
tained the necessary papers to prevent a vessel that had been fitted . 
out in violation of the neutrality l aws from sailing. The consul 
presented these papers to the United States marshall, and he had re-
fused to t ake action. When the consul appealed to the district attorney, 
he stated that the action was very unusual, but still he took no action.46 
By 1817, the privateering problem had t aken on new importance 
for the United States. Privateers from South America , especially 
Buenos Aires, Venezuela and Mexico, were t aking a gr owing number of 
American ships as prizes. 1Jiaey of these privateers were sailing 
from Buenos Aires in direct violation of her privateering regul ations. 
The Constitution and laws of Buenos Aires required a captain and one-
half of the crew of all privateers to be citizens. A five year r esidence 
was required for naturalization, so it was very evident that marry of 
these crews, and some of t he captains, could be classed only as 
pirates.47 
The establishments made at .Amelia and Galveston brought such 
an increase in thi s privateering that several American merchant s 
petitioned t he government for naval protection for American commerce.48 
Despatches from Prevost and Rodney , both Amer ican agents in South 
/ 46 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, hhl. 
Onis to Adams, July 9-:;-TIIT7. This is a good example to show the 
feeling of many Americans towards Spain. Often t iraes the actions 
of Americans could be explained by their dislike of Spain as much 
as their des ire to aid the Spanish colonies . 
47 Ibid., 49h. 
48 Whitaker, .£E• cit., 279,..80 . 
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America, indica ted that t his was the only solut i on, and for proof 
poi nted t o Gr eat Br i t a in, who had maintained a s quadr on in the South 
Atlantic ·for s ome t ime . 49 
Protests to t he South American governments had little effect , 
so by a l aw of March 3, 1819, the United States followed Great Br itain's 
pol icy of providing prot ection to her merchant ships . This new law 
was intended t o deal par tly ~rith privateering from Americ an ports, 
but its more important effect was to give the United States Navy the 
new power of conveying American merchantmen on t he high seas . It als o 
gave the navy the author ity to r et ake any vessel belonging to the United 
St ates , or its citizens , that had been uhlawfully captured on the high 
seas . 5° This act showed that although .American neutrality favored 
t he Spanish Americans , _t he United States intended to enforce it against 
t he revolutionists jus t as strictly as agains t Spain. 
This new neutral ity law was f l lowed by the appointment of 
Commodor e Perry t o go to South America i n an attempt to end these 
privateer ing practices . He died before reaching Buenos Aires , and 
his successor, Commodore Morris , was in Buenos Aires during the 
uprisings that were eventual ly to place Rivadavia in power . Finally , 
John Forbes was sent as an agent, with the clear i ng up of these dif-
ficulties as one of his duti es . 51 
49 Whita1(er, 22• cit., 280 . 
50 Annals of Congr es s , 15th Congr ess , 2nd Session, 2523- 24. 
A copy of this law is found in the appendix. 
51 Manning , op. cit., I , 130- 31. Adams to Forbes , Jul y 
$, 1820 . Forbes ar r ived in Buenos Air es on October 24, 1820. 
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Forbes arrived in Buenos Aires during a period of great 
politi cal unrest. It was not until July , 1821, t hat stable govern-
ment returned to Buenos Aires , vvith the establi shment of the Republic 
of Buenos Aires .52 Because of the feeling that had arisen against 
Forbes and the uncertainty of t he new government, he delayed for 
el even months making his demands for changes in the privateering 
system of Buenos Aires.53 
Forbes present ed his complaints to Rivadavi a by a note on 
Sept ember lL~, 1821, and by a conference on Sept ember 17, 1821 . At 
t his time he pointed out the vi olations of t he privateering laws , as 
mentioned above. He r eminded Rivadavia t ha t many of t he Buenos Ail"'es 
privateers were sailing under mor e t han one commiss i on, and that 
according to the l aws of the government, t his made the per s onnel 
pir ates. 54 
Rivadavia admitted that many of t hese char ges were true and 
promised that cor r ecti ons woul d be made soon .55 On ·October 6, 1821, 
Forbes was pr esent ed with a copy of a decree issued by the Buenos 
52 Pueyrred6n had been r emoved from off ice f or his a t t empts 
t o pl ace a French prince on t he t hr one of Buenos Aires . The Republic 
of Buenos Aires was formed after this under t he lead of Rivadavia . 
53 The Forbes mis sion i s discussed in Chapt er II. 
54 .American State 4ape8s , Forei gn Relations, IV, 823 . Forbes t o Rivadavia, July 1 ,1 21 . 
55 Loe. ci t. Conference between Forbes and Rivadavia, 
September 17, 182i:-
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Aires Department of War and Marine which recognized the injustice 
of their pr ivateeri ng system . By this order , all privateers sail-
ing under the Buenos Aires flag wer e recalled and their commissions 
revoked . .56 
By t hi s time the original purpose of the privateers, that of 
driving the Spanish fleet from South America, had been fulfilled . 
The revocation of t hese pr ivateering l aws removed one mor e block-
ade from the path of American recognition of these cl.e facto govern-
ments • 
.56 Ibid ., 824 . 
CHAPTER V 
UNITED STATES RECOGNITI ON AND SOUTH AMERICA 
One of the problems faced by t he Uni ted States during these 
revolutions in South Amer i ca was t he recognition, or non-recognition, 
of the newly f ormed states. If Unit ed St ates r ecognit i on had been 
decided only by American policy, t he pr obl em would be simpl e , but 
such is not the case. From 1815, vrl1en seri ous thought on recog-
nition became publi c, up t o the actual r ecognition ei ght ye ars l ater, 
American policy was constantly being influenced, and at times dictated, 
·by the actions of t he European powers. 
Henry Clay was one of the f irs t Americans to arouse national 
interes t on t he sub ject of r ecogni tion. Clay brou ght thi s questi on 
to the f ore on J31:uary 20 , 1816, in a debate concerni ng t he reducti on 
of the army. He was qui ck t o remind Americans of t he ideas of l egi t-
imacy as formed at the Congress of Vienna, and to suggest t hat t here 
mi ght be a need for an army t o defend and protect American int erests. 
The independence of South America was considered an American int er est 
by Clay .l Nine days l ater he poi nt ed out that an army might be 
needed to aid the South Amer icans i n their f i ght to rid the Western 
Hemisphere of Old World domination~ ? Clay was not sure of t he pl ans 
1 Annals of Congress , 14th Congress, 1st Session (Washi ng-
ton: Gales and Seaton,]]19), 724 . 
2 .!_bid., 790. 
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being made by European s tates , but from future happenings we can see 
now that there was some reason to be prepared for European action in 
regard t o Spanish A.merica . 3 
The adminis t ration had been attempting to keep in contact 
with South American happenings , but t heir information was limited. 
President Madison had sent Joel Poinsett to Buenos Aires in 1810 as 
an 11 agent for seamen and commerce 11 , and in 1811 William Miller and 
Poinsett were appoi nted consuls . These appointments were approved 
by the Senate, and the men had accepted formal exequaturs from the 
governments to 1rl1ich they were sent . This was as close to recogni-
tion as it was possible to go . After the War of 1812 , the United 
States adopted a pol i cy of fonnal neutrality .4 Wi th this move, the 
Pr es ident ceased t o use consuls and returned to t he earlier practice 
of sending special agent s , whci did not requir e senatorial coIL-firmation . 
This was done to remove any implicati on of any form of formal 
recognition. 5 
During t he War of 1812, Great Britain made an attempt to 
obtain better r elations between the colonies and Spain throu gh the 
use of mediation . This British action was based on a desire f or aid 
3 Arthur Pr eston Whitaker, The United States and the 
I ndependence of Latin Amer i ca , 1800-1830 (Baltimore : The Johns 
Hopkins Press;-19IiIT," 191. 
4 James D. Richar dson, A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of t he President s , 1789-1897 (Washington : Government Printing 
Office , 1897), I, 561-62. 
5 Samuel Flagg Bemis , The Latin American Policy of t he 
United States (New Yor k : Harcourt , Brace and Company, 1943)~2- 34 . 
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to Spain and herself during the Napoleonic Wars, and then a settle-
ment of all disputes after the war in Europe was over.6 Great Britain 
did not expect much good to come from this mediation, but she knew 
Spain would quit the European war as soon as trade and resources 
from the colonies stopped.7 
The year 1815 found the United States and Spain on unfriendly 
terms. The question of t he Louisiana boundary still remained, and 
the Southern states were having increasing trouble with Spanish 
Florida. The threat of war with Spain would have-,been welcomed b-.f 
many, but the position of Great Britain in event of such a war was a 
question. On December 10, 1815, Secretary of State Monroe asked John 
Quincy Adams, United States minister to Great Britain, 11 In case of a 
rupture between the U. S. & Spain at any future t ime , what part will 
Great Br itai n take in the contest .•• ? 11 8 Adams stated on January 
22, 1816, that 11 all the propens i ties of t he British Government vtlll 
be against us. 11 9 Adams went on t o observe that Bri tish feeling against 
the United States was very strong because of the high taxes caused 
by the War of 1812 and the desi re of many people for another war 
with t he United St ates . 
6 William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American 
Nations (New York : Oxford University Press, 1925;,TII , 1432. 
Jonathan Russell to Secreta.I"J of State Monroe , February 3, 1812. 
7 Loe. cit. -- --
8 Ibid., I, 18 . Monroe to Adams , December 10, 1815. 
9 Ibid., III, 1434. Adams to Monroe, January 22, 1816. 
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In a later despatch Adams commented on American neutrality 
and observed that English public opinion favored the colonies, but 
was definitely against the United States. Adams reasoned that as 
long as the United States remained neutral, Great Britain would also, 
but that if the United States attacked Spain, or sided with the col-
onies, Great Britain could be expected to attack the United States.10 
Thus, neutrality was of even greater aid to the South Americans than 
United States recognition or aid. 
This feeling of the British, plus the cooperation between all 
the European powers brought about by the 11 Concert of Europe 11 , placed 
the United States in a position where caution was necessary . The 
American policy at this time was virhat could be called a negative one . 
The basic principle was to do nothing that could provoke European 
intervention in South America . For this , formal neutrality was the 
American answer.11 
The poss i bility of mediation between Spain and t he colonies 
remained, but the chances for its success were growing less. Spain 
was unwilling to accept the British terms, which were free trade, but 
her attempts to get some other power to repl ace Great Britain were 
not too successful. The English were willing to have the colonies 
return to Spain, but only on the condition that t r ade with them woul d 
remain open to the British. George W. Erving, United States minis t er 
to Spain, stated the position of the Spanish on mediation by other 
lO Ibid., III, 1437. Adams to Monroe, March 30, 1816. 
11 Whitaker,~• cit., 208-17. 
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powers as being 11 favorabie received, yet it were vain to expect suc-
cess from any mediation in which England is not a party, or indeed 
th€1,t arry mediatory power will act on other than her principles . "12 
Some speculation arose about Russia, who had considerable influence 
in Spain, taking the place of England in the mediation, but this was 
never carried into effect.13 
By the l ast or' 1817, t he question of South American policy 
was beginning to occupy a more :important pos i t i on in American think-
ing. James Monroe had become President on March 4, 1817, and he pos-
sessed more of an interest -in South America than had Madison. However, 
his desire to see a free Spanish America did not blind him to the 
risks still present from Europe . The declaration of i ndependence of 
t he United Provinces in 1816, and the successes of San Martfu also 
played a part in feeding this development of interest in South America. 
By April, 1817, there were indi cations that a split was develop-
ing betvveen the European powers. This was confir med on April 24, 
1817, when the French minis t er t o the United States, Hyde de Neuville , 
presented a proposal to the administration of a "concert" between 
France, Spain and the United States . The es sence of this proposition 
was to secure favorabl e commercial relations , while cutting Great 
Britain completely out. The United States refused to take par t in 
t his because of t he dispute wit h Spain over Florida and Louisiana .14 
12 Manning, 2£· cit ., III, 1931. Erving t o Adams, April 6, 1817. 
13 Ibid ., III, 1947,. Erving to Adams, August 27, 1~17. 
14 Whitaker, EE· cit., 226- 29, discusses subject in more detail . 
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While this conference was not successful from the French viewpoint, 
it certainly was welcome news to the United States. It was evidence 
of European politics beginning to work in favor of the United States. 
This confirn1ation of a split in European politics concerning 
South America put new life in the administration's policy. On 
April 25, 1817, Monroe wrote Poinsett, requesting him to make another 
trip to South America. Monroe stated that 
The progress of the revolution in the Spanish provinces, 
which has alway::: been interesting to t he United States , is 
made much more so, by many causes, and particularly by a 
well founded hope that it will succeed.15 
Monroe wanted to send an agent who could contract the many differen t 
views of the colonists, yet woul d be trusted and r espec ted in both 
South America and the United States.16 To the surprise of Monroe , 
Poinsett refused the appointment. His reason was his recent ele~tion 
to the legislature of South Carolina.17 
This action of Monroe did not mean the steps would be 
taken for immediate recognition, but it did indicate t he possibi lity 
of action of this tY]_)e in the near future. The selection of Poinsett 
for such a mission made recognition seem more likely since it must 
be r emembered that Poinsett had been very active in the cause of 
independence while in South Amer ica and after his return to the 
United States. 
15 Jllianning, op. cit., I, 39. Monroe to Poinsett, April 25, 1817. 
16 Ibid., I, 39-40. 
17 Frederic L. Paxson, The Independence of the South American 
Republics (Philadelphia: FerrisMd Leach, 1903)~120. --
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With the refusal of Po:insett, Monroe decided to send a 
·commission instead of a single agent. Caesar A. Rodney and John 
Graham were appointed on July 18, 1817, but t heir departure was 
delayed until December, 1817, at which t ime t hey were joined by the 
third commissioner, Theodorick Bland.18 
Monroe's cabinet meeting on Oct ober 30, 1817, is f ur ther 
evidence of the inclination t oward South American independence. At 
this meet i ng he put the follovnng questions to his cqbinet: 
Has the executive power t o aclmovrl edge t he independence of 
t he new stat es whose i ndependence i s not recogni zed by the 
parent count~J and between which parti es war exis ts? 
Is sending a minis ter equai to recognition? 
Is it expedi ent for t he United States to recognize Buenos 
Aires or other revolted pr ovi nces ?l9 
The cabinet was hesitant to encourage Monroe on any of t hese acts, 
but t hey di d encourage t he sending of t he commissi oner s t o observe 
the ~onditions exi sting in Sout h America at that t :irne . 20 
The journey of the t hree cormnissioners to South America was 
the cause of cons i derable unrest of European diplomats. The Bri tish 
suspect ed t ba t t he commissioners woul d car ry "V'ri t h t hem t he power of 
formal r ecogniti on.21 The main r eason for Br itish unrest concern-
ing recognit i on at that t ime was the ef fect i t might have upon their 
18 See Chapt er I I for a more compl ete discuss ion on the 
commiss ioners and their work. 
19 Samuel Flagg Bemis , "Early Diplomatic Mi s si ons f r om 
Buenos Aires to the United States , 1811-1824, 11 Pro ceedings of the 
American Antiquari an Society, New Ser ies , XLIX (Apr il 19, 1939-:-
0ctober 18, 1939 ); 60. 
20 Ibid., 60-61. 
21 Manning, .££• cit., III, 1957. Ervi ng to Adams , January 10, 
1818. 
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trade with South America. 22 The Spanish were also sure the coIIIlTiis-
sioners would recognize some of the insurgent governments. This 
opinion was shared by the Spanish minis ter in Washingt on as well as 
the Spanish govermnent at Madrid . 23 No doubt more than one European 
breathed a s igh of relief when t he commission re turned without offer-
ing formal r ecognition to any of t he Spanish provi nces in r evolt. 
Monroe's first year in office witness ed the Aguirre mission 
from Buenos Ai r es. The acti ons of Monroe and Adams t oward Aguirre's 
demands and work are a good indication of t he admini s tration I s deter-
minat ion to maintain neutrali t y . Aguirre's arrest in New York f or 
violation of American neutrality laws di d little to promote good 
f eeling on the part of Aguirre for the United Sta tes, and it cer-
tainly did not increase respect in t his c ount ry for t he governments 
of Sputh America.24 
Aguirre's demands for r ecognit i on were probably prompted 
largely by the actions of Henry Cl ay in the House of Representatives. 
With t he election of Monroe, Clay bel ieved he would be offer ed the 
post of Secretary of St ate. When he was by- pas sed for John Quincy 
Adams, Clay became a bitter cr iti c of admini strati on policy . The 
South Amer i can revolutions gave him an excel lent opportuni ty to 
publicly _ ques tion the policies of Monroe and Adams. It mus t be 
remembered, as pointed out above, Clay had been int erested in South 
American independence bef or e the election of Monroe i n 1816 . 
22 Loe. cit. -- --
23 Ibid., III, 1957, and I, 64. 
24 The Aguirre mission is discussed in Chap ter III. 
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Clay started his attack on the administration on March 24, 
1818. At this time the House was considering a bill to appropriate 
money for the corrnnissioners, who were in South America at this time. 
Clay suddenly raised the question of recognition by moving to insert 
a provision to appropriate the sum of eighteen thousand dollars 
as the outfit and one year's salary of a Minister to be de-
parted from the United States to the independent provinces of 
the River Plata, in South America.25 
Clay poi nted out in defending this move t hat the United States had 
become established on the basis of a de facto government, and since 
that time it had been our policy to recognize t he de f acto government 
of a nation. Clay argued that if we were to continue t his policy 
we would have to recognize the South American nations at once . 26 
The President was quick to reply to Cl ay 's attempt to force 
his hand in foreign policy. In a message to the House the next day, 
Monroe stated that 11 the present acknowledgment of the Government of 
La Plata, in any mode was deemed by t he President inexpedient. 
to t he i r interests as to those of t he Unit ed States. 11 27 It is 
interesting to note that this was the first important congressional 
. debate on the subject of recognition of t hese South American states . 
The supporters of the administration's policy were quick to 
attack Clay's proposal. Forsyth of Georgia was especially cri t i cal 
of Clay. He pointed out that England gained more from l a Plata than 
25 Annals of Congress, 15th Congress, 1st Session, 1468 . 
26 Ibid., 1488. 
27 Manning, .£Q.• cit., I, 60. Monroe to House of Repr esffi1ta-
tives, March 25, 1818. 
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the United States, t herefore let her take the risks as well as the 
profits of recognition. He attempted to point out the damage a war 
with Spain could bring to American commerce , particularly if Engl and 
remained allied with Spain. Forsyth could not see any commercial 
advantage to recognition. He observed that our ships enter la Plata 
ports freely and their ships had free access to American ports. 
Next, Forsyth stated that no minister had arrived from la Plata de-
manding acceptance, therefore it was possible they did not desire 
recognition as yet. He was also cri tical of Clay for attempt ing to 
take from the esident his constitutional power of conducting 
foreign affairs.28 
Sanmel Smith of Maryland attacked Clay and his supporters 
from a commercial aspect. He stated the United States had nothing 
to gain from South American independence but would suffer because 
of the competition of these states . Smith pointed out that the 
United States and la Plata produced many identical products, there-
fore the goods they needed t hey would mos t likely purchase from 
some state that would in turn buy from them. 29 
A. Smyth of Virginia objected to Clay's proposal from a 
constitutional viewpoint. He maintained the House had no part or 
responsibility in establishing foreign policy . He stated trat 
You [ the Hou;:ie] possess the power of impeacln:nent, and 
consequently, may, discuss, and, by resolution, express, an 
28 
29 
Annals of Congress, 15th Congress, 1st Session, 1.502-18. 
Ibid., .l.541-42. 
opinion on any past act either of the Executive or of the 
Judicia:nr; but you have no right to give a direction to 
either.JD 
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Clay and his followers counter attacked vigorously with the 
reminder that Spanish American independence meant the freedom of 
America.31 The House remained much more calm t han Clay, and when 
the final vote was taken his proposal was soundly defeated, 115 to 
45 .32 The refusal of most Representatives to accept this resolution 
was probably based on the danger of war with Europe. Spain alone was 
not feared, but the action of the other European powers was an impor-
tant consideration . For most people, recognition was not important 
enough to threaten the destruction of American cormnerce at the hands 
of Great Britain and the privateers that would be released by Spain . 
By the middle of 1818, events were happening in Europe that 
were to influence American foreign policy once again . Secretary of 
State Adams learned. in May, 1818, that Great Britain had agreed to 
a general mediation of European powers between Spain and the co lonies . 
This was disturbing to the United States s:ince the British minister 
shortly before this had promised to keep the United States informed 
about the movement for mediation . 33 The State Depar~ment was not 
exceptionally worried that Great Britain would take part in any -
f orceful mediation, 34 but they were interested :in the plans of the 
30 Ibid., 1569- 70 . 
31 Ibid., 1605, 1643 . 
32 Ibid., 1646 . 
33 Whitaker, .£2• cit., 251. 
34 Manning, op . cit . , III , 1441. Rush t o Adams, March 21 , 1818. 
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Europeans allies . On May 19 , 1818, Adams instructed Albert Gallatin, 
United States minister to France , to ascertain t he intentions of 
the allies. Adams explained that the Uni ted States desired to main-
tain a just policy toward all , and their plans must be knovm in 
order to do this . Gallatin was warned that 
we do not wish to join them in any plan of interference be-
t ween the parties; and above all tha t we can neither accede to 
nor approve of any interference to restore any part of the 
Spanish supremacy , in any of the South American Provinces. 35 
Adams sent similar instruct ions to Richard Rush in Great 
Britain the next day. In case of an invi t ation to the United St at es 
to take part in t hese negot i ations, Rush was instructed to 
let it be known that we have no desire to parti cips. te i n it; 
and above all that we will join in no plan of pacification 
founded on any other basis t hag tha t of t he entire Indepen-
dence of the South Americans .3 
Adams stated in this same communication t hat the administration was 
convinced the basic British policy was independence for South ArrBri ca. 
It was f elt t hat as soon as Great Britain had satisfied her sense of 
duty to Spain, she would establish a policy of independence . 
Thus, by May, 1818, the administration had become convinced 
that independence was assured for South Ameri ca. The Amer i can belie f 
that Great Britain would not take part in aey action t hat would ruin 
her trade was partly res ponsible for the development of this poli cy, 
but the succes ses of the South American patriots in defeating the 
Spanish forces also helped Monroe and Adams to make this decision . 
35 Ibid. ~ I, 66. Adams to Gallatin, May 19 , 1818 . 
36 Ibid ., I , 69 . Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818 . 
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It was during this flurry of activi ty concerning South Amer i ca 
that the three American commissioner s r eturned. 37 Whil e their reports 
were not t he encouragement expected, t hey did hel p i n the establi sh-
ment of American policy . They agr eed that it would be impossible 
,for Spain to retake t he t erritory by her mvn force , but there was 
disagreement on the conditions of internal affair s . The conclusion 
dravm was that considerable unres t and unstability existed . Two 
t heories were establ i shed by Br ackenridge , the secretary on the mis-
sion: One , t he United St ates would have t o be the first to acknow-
ledge the independence of any part of South America_;38 and t vro , there 
was no danger t hat Spain would consider reco gnition as a cause for 
war ivith the Uni t ed States . 39 
By f all, 1818, pl ans were being laid for the joint mediation, 
but the position of Gr eat Britain i n such plans was becoming more and 
mor e vague . By October, the chances of the Allied power s reaching 
an agreement seemed remote . Rush stated "there seems to be but 
little prospect of t heir coming t o accord . . • . 11 40 ThJ November , 
it had become apparent to the United St ates that Gr eat Britain would 
t ake no par t in these moves . 41 The Congress of Aix- la- Chapelle had 
37 The return of the commissioners is discussed in Chapt er II . 
38 H. M. Br ackenridge , Voyage t o South Amer i ca (Baltimore : 
H. M. Brackenridge, 1819) , II, 247 . 
39 ~ -, II , 356 . 
40 Manning, -2£· ci t ., III , 1978 . Rush t o Adams, October 24 , 1818 . 
41 Ibid., 1449 . Rush to Adams , November 20, 1818 . 
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adjourned when the British refused to take part in the intervention 
proposed by France and Russia . This plan proposed the use of coer-
cion by threats and economic sanctions . 
Great Britain made one more attempt to med:ia te between Spain 
and the colonies, but Spain refused to accept the British offer. By 
March, 1819, the attempts to reach a settlement were dropped by Great 
Britain, and this a]_rnost forced all other powers to follow sui t.42 
On looking back over these attempts at mediation, it appears 
that while Britain was interested in a peaceful settlement, the French 
and Russians had attempted to use mediation as a means of causing 
Spanish distrust of Englanct . 43 It appears doubtful that France or 
Russia were ever seriously interested in a :r:;eaceful settlement of 
the Spanish colonial problem. 
The British stand on mediation actually assurred the eventual 
independence of Latin America . The British historian C. K. i ebster, 
states that after this , recognition was regarded 11 rather as a matter 
of t ime than principle . 11 44 The British also made use of mediation 
to delay the recognition of these states . Castlereagh kept the 
possibility of British mediation before the United States as long 
as possible , even after he knew these negotiations could not be 
42 Ibid., III , 1454 . Rush to Adams, March 22 , 1819 . 
43 The Cambridge History of Bri tish Foreign Policy (New 
York : The 1[acmillan Company, 1923;, II, 15 . 
44 C. K. ebster, Britain and the Independence of Latin 
America, 1812-1830 (London : Oxford University Press, 1938) , I, ]4. 
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successful . He believed this move would delay United States recog-
nition of South .American governments, and in this he was correct .45 
By August, 1818, Monroe was convinced that some of the 
' Spanish .American governments should be recognized in the near future. 
Nevertheless, there was some hesitation on immediate action without 
knowing the r eactions such a move would bring from other powers . In 
an effort to find out these reactions, instructions were sent to the 
United States ministers in England, France and Russia . They were 
to determine how each government woul d 11 view an acknowledgment of 
the i ndependence of the colonies by the United States . 1146 
The replies to this request for information concerning 
·European reactions were encouraging . Gallatin reported on the views 
of Europe in gener al, and it seemed that protests , but no action 1,,rere 
all that could be expected . 47 Rush restated the idea that Gr eat 
Britain would not find such action as a cause for war . He also 
renewed the belief that the British government was changing to the 
idea of independence for Spanish .America .48 
By the end of 1818, Monroe felt that United States policy 
tmrard Spanish .America could become more bold . He decided it was 
time to make a definite bi d for cooperation ,rith Great Britain . 
This was definitely Monroe ' s view and not that of his Secretary of 
Stat e Adams . John Quincy Adams had just returned from his former 
45 Ibid., 43 . 
46 Manning, .2£• cit., I , Augus t 15, 1818 . 
/.~ 7 Whit aker, EE_. cit., 264 . 
48 Manning, op . ci t., I II , 1449- 50 . Rush t o Adams, November 
20 , 1818. 
72 
position as United States minister to the Court of St. James, and 
he could see very little possibility for Anglo-American cooperation. 
His observations had been that the classes in England that favored 
Spanish American independence were the most hostile to the United 
States, while the government, which was friendly to the United States, 
was definitely opposed to independence for Latin America.49 
The idea of joint action by the United States and Great 
Britain in South America was not new. Earlier in 1818, Rush had 
been told to suggest cooperation to the British govermnent . 50 
Castlereagh had replied to Rush 1s suggestion that he could see no 
way in which the policies of the t wo countries were identical or 
could easily be made so.51 
Adams drew up the instructions to Rush under t he date of 
January 1, 1819 . Rush was told to mention to Castlereagh 
that the President has it in contempl ation to grant ••• an 
Exequatur, or otherwise to recognize t he Government of Buenos 
Ayres, at no remote period, should no event occur which will 
justify a further postponement of that intention. If it should 
suit the views of Great Britain to adopt similar measures at 
the same time and in concert with us, it will be highly satis-
factory to the President .52 
Two important things might be noted about this note. First, and hav-
ing little to do with this study, the United States mad e the pr oposal 
in 1819, while Gr~at Britain was to make a p roposal for cooperation 
49 Whitaker, .9.E• cit., 262 . 
50 Manning, .9.E• cit ., I , 66-70 . Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818. 
5l Ibid. , III , 1447 , Rush to Adams, Augus t 3, 1818 . 
52 Ibid. , I , 87 . Adams to Rush, January 1, 1819 • 
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in South American policy a few years later. Second, the last sentence 
can be interpreted as proposing British backing of American foreign 
policy for South America. 
The recep tion Castlereagh gave t his plan was far from that 
expected by Monroe . Rush presented the proposal to him at a confer-
ence on February 12, 1819. Castlereagh observed t ha t the United 
States assumed that Great Britain favored t he indepe ndence of Latin 
America, but t hat - the policy of t he British government always had 
been, and still was , the return of t he colonies to Spanish controi. 53 
When this correspondence reached the United Stat es, it became appar ent 
that Adams' beliefs were correct, at l east those concerning the 
policy and expected actions of the Britis h government . 
This rebuff at the hands of the Briti sh probably had the effect 
of delaying American recognition of Buenos Air ex. HryNever, events tak-
ing place in South Alner ica aff ected United States policy also. The 
stability that had existed i n Buenos Aires came to an end w:ii.th the 
ey,.ile of Pueyrredon and t he revi val of revolution and uneasy political 
conditions. This condition was general in South An1erica and can not 
be attributed only to Buenos Aires. The lack of any stable government 
was certain to delay recogniti on. 
Monroe had little t ~ne to contemplate on Br itish policy or 
South American revolts, for on February 19, 1819, Secret ary of St ate 
Adams and Spanish minister Luis de On{s s igned a treaty settling the 
Florida question. For a better under s tanding of this treaty and the 
effects it was to have, it is necessary to study it briefly . 
53 Ibid., III, 1451. Rush t o Adams , February 15, 1819. 
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Interest in Florida was older than the revolutions in South 
America . By 1810, enough Americans had moved into West Florida to 
call a convention and declare themselves independent of Spain. In 
a message to Congress on January 3, 1811, lfudison advised Congress 
of his acceptance of West Florida as part of the Louisiana Purchase. 
At t his time he stated the principle that 
the United States could not see without serious inquietude any 
part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different 
respects so deep and so jus t a concern pass from the hands of 
Spain into those of any other foreign prince .55 
Due to the French occupation of Spain, this problem remained qu iet, 
but the return of Ferdinand in 1815, brought Spanish demands for 
settlement of this disputed territory. 
The attempts t o negotiate this treaty unoffic ially start on 
December 19, 1815, with the reco gnition of Don Luis de On{s as 
Spanish minister to the United States .56 On December 30 , 1815, Oni s 




Restoration of West Florida to Spain 
Punishment for uprisings in Louisiana that had been directed 
against Spain and assurances steps would be taken to pre-
vent such happenings in the future . 
Refusal to allow ships flying flags of territories in revolt 
against Spain to be admitted to United States ports . 57 
55 Richardson,~• cit., I , 488 . 
56 Whitaker, ~ . cit. , 19 3. on( s had been in the United 
States more than six years and served as the unrecognized representa-
tive of Ferdinand during his forced abdicati on. 
57 Summarized from American Stat e Papers, Foreign Relations , 
IV, 422- 23 . On{s to Monroe, December3c5;-1815. 
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On January 19, 1816, Secretary of State Monroe addressed a 
lengthy reply to onfs. Monroe reminded Onis that the United States 
had attempted to purchase West Florida from Spain, but had been in-
formed this territory had been transferred to France. Therefore, this 
became American territory with the purchase of Louisiana from France . 
The United States had suggested an exchange of Florida for territory 
in the West, but Spain refused the offer and suggested no counter 
proposal. Based upon these claims, plus the refusal of Spain to 
ta.lee action to protect the United States from attacks by people under 
the control of Spain 1tlthin the Floridas , and the refusal to pay 
r eparat ions for injuries from t hese attacks, t he United States f elt 
entirely jus t ified in t heir action in Vest Florida . Monroe informed 
on{s the United States was unaware of any force collecting in Louisiana . 
He added t hey would take proper action 11,hen adaquate information was 
f urnished . In regard to the provincial ships entering American ports, 
Monroe stated that 
it is U.S. Policy to allow any ship to enter as long as al l 
duties, etc. are pai d , and proper conduct i s mai ntained . A 
ship is not to be judged by the flag it i s flying .58 
Finally, Monroe observed that 
All your Government had a right to claim of t he United 
States was, that they shouil!.d not interfere in the contest 
or promote, by any active service, t he success of the revolu-
tion, admitting that they continued to overlook the injustices 
received from Spain, and r emained at peace . 59 
58 Ibid., IV, 425. / Monroe to Onis, January 19, 1816 . 
59 Ibid., IV, 426. Monroe to On{s , January 19, 1816. 
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Through the res t of 1816 and the first of 1817, Spain con-
tinued to protest American action in Florida, her aid to South 
America and her neutrality laws . The State Department in turn pro-
tested Spain ' s actions in Florida and defended its neutral position . 60 
Fonnal negotiations had been opened at '.fashington in February, 1817, 
but by July these had broken dmm. On July 16, 1817, the Spanish 
First Secretary of State , Jose Pizarro, proposed to United States 
George Erving, that the negotiations be continued in Spain instead 
of Washington . 61 Erving refused this , exceD"t, on existing basis of 
the pending negotiations . 62 
On July 27 , 1817, Pizarro suggested a short discussion to 
establish the points of controversy and then to present a plan for a 
basis for a treaty . 63 Erving denied any reason to discuss the points 
of controversy, but he stated he would be interested in the Spanish 
plan for the basis of a treaty . 64 Thee proposals were communicated 
to Erving on August 17, 1817, and included was the exchange of Florida 
for all territory west of the Mississippi River . 65 This proposal, 
60 See Manning, III , 1903- 40 , and American State Papers, 
Foreign Relations , IV, 428- 431. 
61 American State Papers , Foreign Relations, IV 442 . 
Erving, July 16, 18D. ' Pizarro to 
62 Ibid. , IV. 443 . Erving to Pizarro, July 19, 1817 . 
63 Ibid ., IV, 444 . Pizarro to Erving, July 27 , 1817 . 
64 Ibid., IV, 444- 45 . Erving to Pizarro, July 29, 1817 . 
65 Ibid ., IV, 448 . Pizarro to Erving, August 17, 1817 . 
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as well as the others dealing with payment for losses and relations 
·with South America were not new and were refused by Erving .66 
During the next t 1,velve months s:unilar cla:uns and counter 
claims were exchanged by the United States and Spain with little 
advancement being made . 67 The march of General Andrew Jackson, early 
in 1818, into Florida brought a series of protests from Spain, but 
Secretary of State Adams replied that the United States was perfectly 
justified in her act ions since Spain could not handle the problem .68 
Spain ' s answer to this came on Augus t 29 , 1818, when she broke off 
all negotiations for the treaty .69 
On October 18 , 1818, Ortls notified Adams that he had 11 received 
new orders and instructions ••• to resume the negotiation pending 
betvv-e en the Gover nment of the United St ates and that of Spain . 11 70 
Negotiations were probably resumed for two reasons . First, the Jack-
son raid into Florida vividly d~nonstrated to Spain that Florida 
could easily pass to the United States vrith Spain getting no conces-
sion of any kind . Second, the desire of Spain to devote all its 
time and energy- to the recapture of South America with the force 
they were collecting in Spain. This decision to concentrate on 
66 Ibid., IV, 449 . Erving to Pizarro , August 19, 1817 . 
67 Ibid., I V, 450- 65 . 
68 Ibid., I V, 200-01, 496-99 • 
69 Ibid., I V, 523 . 
70 Ibi~., IV, 525 . Oni s to Adams , October 18, 1818 . 
South Amer i ca might also have been because of the refusal of the 
European powers t o i ntervene in Spain ' s behalf i n South America. 71 
78 
These negotiations r esulted in a treaty that was signed by 
the United States on February 22 , 1819. 72 For the United States it 
looked like a great diplomatic victory, but actions of the Spanish 
government delayed final acceptance of the treaty for two years . 
In an eleventh hour effort to delay reco gnitionJ Spain 
/ decided to hold up rat ification of tr:eAdams- 01us treaty . Efforts 
had been made by On{ s to attach a non- recognition clause to the 
treaty, but this had been refused by Adams . 73 The United States 
minister to Spain, John Forsyth, reported to AdamB in August, 1819, 
that the Spanish desired a guarantee we would not recognize any of 
the former colonies until Spain did . Forsyth observed that one 
r eason for this renewed demand. was the Spanish learning of the talks 
between Rush and Castlereagh in Great Britain on February 12, 1819 . 
It was at this time that the UnitErlStates announced t heir intentions 
of recognizing Buenos Aires . 74 
The arrival of a new Spanish minister, Francisco Vives , in 
April, 1820, brought renewed hope for ratification, but Vives was 
not the bearer of such news . He protested America~ actions in aiding 
71 Whita.."kef, 52£ · .£_it ., 267-69 . 
72 Annals of Congress , 15th Congress , 2nd Session, 2135 . 
In rat ifying the t reaty , the Senat e placed a six month limit on 
r at ificat_io'n by Spain. 
73 Manning, 52£. ci t;, I , 109 . Adams t o William Lmmdes , 
Chairman of Foreign Rel ations Commi t t ee i n House of Representat i ves . 
74 Ibid., I II, 1987. Forsyth t o Adams, October 22, 1819 . 
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South .America and the unfairness of the neutrality laws of the United 
States. He was prepared to promise ratification if the United States 
would put a stop to privateers using her ports, stop future aid, 
and, finally, that t hey will form no relations with the pre-
tended Goverrunents of the revolted provinces of Spain situate 
beyond the sea, and will conform to the course of proceeding 
adopted, in this respect, by the other Powers in amity with Spain .75 
Vives expressed the belief that recognition would immediately follow 
ratification in a despatch ten days later, when he stated 
that the belief generally prevailed throughout Eurone that the 
ratification of the treaty by Spain, and the aclmovrled~ent of 
the independence of her rebellious transatlantic colonies by 
the United States , would be simultaneous acts.76 
Adams refused to see any connection between treaty ratifica-
tion and the recognition of the South Americans. Typical of bis 
replies was that one of May 3, 1820, in which he stated: 
As a necessary consequence of the neutrality bevNeen Spain 
and the South American provinces , the United States can, con-
tract no engagement not to form any relations vii th those pro-
vinces . 77 
On May 6, Adams notified Vives that further delay in ratification 
could mean more indemnities and a refusal of the boundary line agreed 
to in the treaty.78 
Forsyth notified the State Department in July, 1820, of the 
meeting of the Spanish Cortes . At this time he observed that some 
75 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 680 . 
Vives to Adams, April~l820 . 
76 Ibid., IV, 682 . Vives to Adams, April 24, 1820. 
77 Manning, op . cit., I, 113 . Ada.ms to Vives, May 3, 1820. 
78 Ibid., I, 115. Adams to Vives, May 6, 1820 . 
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of the deputies would be opposed to the acceptance of the treaty, but 
that it probably would be ac cepted . 79 The treaty was finally signed 
by King Ferdinand VII on October 24, 1820, and sent back to the 
United States for final exchange . 
Since the six month time limit for ratification was long 
before this exhausted, it was necessary for the treaty to be re-
turned to the Senate . It was submitted t o t hat body on February 
13, 1821, and Senate approval was given on February 19, 1821.80 
The formal ratification and exchange took place on February 22 , 1821 , 
just two years after the original had been signed by Adams and On{s. 81 
While t his treaty was being received with great aclaim in 
the United States, the news of it in South .America brought only 
resentment . Many Latin Americans felt that the United States had 
deserted them. The most excepted version was t hat the treaty con-
tained a secret clause in 1vhich the United States traded their recog-
nition of the Spanish provinces for Florida . The more conservative 
view was that the treaty would allow Spain to concent r ate all of her 
forces upon the r ecapture of her colonies . This latter observation 
was true, but the United States could not see passing up the oppor-
tunity to obtain Florida . It had become apparent to the State 
Department that the indeoendence of South .America was a lready achieved, 
and any action by the United States now woul d only delay their formal 
79 Ibid., III, 2000 . Forsyth to Adams , July 13, 1820 . 
80 Annals 9-.~ Congress , 16th Congress, 2nd Session, 11.69. 
8l ~ -, 375 . 
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recognition . Further resentment came from the South because of the 
British living in Buenos Aires and other cities e::qress ed the belief 
that the United States had become the ally of Spain . This was not 
accepted by any large group of people . Views similar to the first 
one mentioned above were also prevalent in Europe . 82 
Despite the attempts made by South America , Spain and the 
other European powers to connect the Adams- Onf s treaty and American 
r ecognition of South America , there seems to be little connection . 
The recognition policy followed by the United States during this 
period had been decided upon before the treaty negotiations had 
started. J.f these negotiations had not been carried out, r ecognition 
would not have come nmch sooner . One basis for the United States 
policy was a stable and orderly government . There was no con-
nection betyreen the treaty and the r evolutions which swept South 
America during 1818 to 1821. If the asswirption that the recogni-
tion was delayed because of the Adams- Onis treaty is follovred, there 
are two questions that can not be answered . Why did Monroe wait 
thirteen months after the ratification before recommending United 
States recognition of the Latin American states? 1:vhy did the 
United Sta tes make YJlovm to Great Britain, in February, 1819, their 
intentions of recognizing the provinces in the near future? 
By February , 1821 , Clay was once again in the fight for 
recognition of the Spanish American states. On February 6, 1821, he 
introduced a bill to appropr iate eighteen thousand dollars 
82 Whitaker, op . cit., 271- 72 . 
82 
For an out fit and one years salary to such Minister as the 
President , by and with the advice and consent of the Senate , 
may send t o any Government of South America , which has esta§-
l ished, and is maintaining its independency of Spain •••• 3 
The vote on t his measure was taken on February 9, 1821, and it , like 
the previous_ one in 1818, w-as defeated. While t he vot e in 1818 had 
been a l opsided 115 to 45, thi s t ime it was 86 to 79 . 84 
CJa y ' s next move on behalf of the South American provi...nces 
came on the day f ol l owing his appropriation defeat , February 10, 
1821. At this time he proposed t he following r esolution : 
That the House of Representatives participates with the 
people of the United States in the deep interest which they 
feel for the success of the Spanish provinces of South America 
whi ch are struggling to establish their liberty and indepen-
dence; and that i t will give its Constitutional suppor t t o t he 
President of the Uni ted States , whenever he may deem it exped-
ient to recognize the sovereignty and independence of any of 
the said provinces.85 
This was debated and finally voted upon i.n two sections, with the 
division bei.ng made at the semicolon. The first section carried by 
a vot e of 134 to 12 . The second s ection Yras approved 87 to 68. A 
committee was then appointed to present t his r esolution to the 
President . 86 Monroe cons idered thi s action of the Hous e as an 
endorsement of his policies , and flu~ther pr eparations were started 
f or the r ecogni tion that would be forthcoming. 
83 Annals of Con~ress , 16th Congress , 2nd Session , 1042. 
84 Ibid., 10.55 . 
85 Ibid., 1082 
86 Ibid., 1091-92 . 
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By the end of 1821, stability was once again r eturning to 
South America. The Republic of Buenos Aires had been formed under 
~he leadership of Rivadavia and other areas were enjoying similar 
freedom and independence . On January 18, 1822, dams informed 
Manuel Torres , a gent from Col bia , that Monroe was giving ser i ous 
thou ht to recognition . 87 On January JO, 1822, the House of Repre-
sentatives called upon President Monroe to send it the correspondence 
dealing with the Spanish American governments . It also requested 
information on the political conditions of this section of the 
Western Hemisphere and the state of the war between the colonies 
and Spain. 88 
Monroe replied to this request with a special message to 
Congress on March 8, 1822 . In reviewing the progr ess of the 
colonies toward independence, Monroe stated that 
This contest has now r eached sue a stage , and been attended 
with such decisive success on the pa.rt of the provinces , that it 
merits the most profound c~nsideration whether their right to 
the rank of independent nations , with all the advantages incident 
to it , in their intercourse with the United States, is not 
complete . 89 
Monroe continues to observe that 
~e are compelled to conclude ••• that the provinces which 
have declared their independence , and are :i_r1 the enjoyment of 
it, ought to be r ecognized. 90 





Annals of Congress , 17th Congress , 1st Session , 2099 . 
Ibid., 825- 28. 
American State Papers , Foreign Relations, IV, 818. 
Loe. cit . 
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Should Congress concur in the view herein presented, they 
will doubtless see the propriet y of ma.king the necessary 
appropriations for carrying it ( recogniti on] into effect . 91 
Monroe's address and the documents submitted by Secretary 
of State Adams were turned over to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs . In their report on March 19, 1822 , the committee observed 
that recognition of these governments would only recognize an exist-
ing fact . United States recognition would in no way furnish them 
assistance in breaking the bonds between Spain and her colonies . 
The committee also pointed out that Spain had not s ent a company of 
men to South America in the last three years . 92 Upon hearing this 
report, the House passed the following resolutions on March 28, 1822 . 
That the House of Representatives concur in the opinion ex-
pressed by the President in his message of the 8th of :March, 
1821, that the American provinces of Spain -which have declared 
their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it , ought to 
be recognized-by the United States as independent nations . 
That the Committee of ,ra;}Sand Mans be instructed to report 
a bill appropriating a sum not exceeciing one hundred thousand 
dollars , to enable the President of the United States to give 
due effect to such r ecognition. 93 
11.his second resolution was carried out with the enactment of the 
following law on May 4, 1822 : 
Be it enacted, etc ., That , for such Missions to the indepen-
dentnations on the American continent as t he President of the 
United States may deem proper , there be , and hereby is , appro-
priated a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars to be 
paid out of any money in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated . 94 
91 American State Papers , Foreign Relations , IV, 818-19 . 
92 ~ing, ~• ~•, I , 151-55 . 
93 Annals of Congress, 17th Congress , 1st Session, 1403. 
94 Ibid., 2603- 04 . 
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As expected, t he Spani sh were quick to protest Pres ident 
Monroe ' s actions proposed in his speech of March 8, 1822 . Spanish 
minister Joaqufu de Anduaga r eplied to this speech that the South 
American governments were still not stable and there remained a 
chance f or reunion with Spai..n . He delcared that recognition 
can in no way now, or at any time , l essen or invalidate in the 
l east the right of Spa.in to the said provinces , ~ to employ 
whatever means may be in her power to reunite them to the rest 
of her dominions:'9'5 - -------
Secretary of State Adams replied that recognition was not "intended 
to inval idate any right of Spain, 11 but was only an aclmowledgment 
of the existing fact of independence . 96 The Spanish continued to 
protest , but by this time the threat of ,var had diminished . Forsyth 
virote from Spain on June 23 , 1822 , that Spain would probably 11not 
do more than break off their diplomatic intercourse with us . 11 97 
The first formal recognition of a r evolting province c2me 
on June 19, 1822 , when John Quincy Adams presented ~•Ta.nuel Torres 
as charge d 1affaires for the Republic of Columbia , to President 
Monroe . 98 The Republic of Buenos Aires was formally r ecognized on 
January 27 , 1823, with senatorial approval for Caesar A. Rodney 
as United States minister to that state . 99 
95 American St ate Papers , Foreign Relations, rv, 846 . 
Anduaga to Adams , March 9, 1822 . 
96 Wanning , 9,£• cit ., I , 157 . Adams t o A.nduaga , April 6, 1822. 
97 American State Papers , Foreign Relations , V, 37if• 
Forsyth to Adams , June 23 , 1822 . 
98 PaY.son , 9.£, cit . , 177. 
99 Bemis, "Earl y Mission(i , 11 op . cit ., 93- 94 . 
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With the American recognition of some of the Spanish American 
states , Great Br itain moved closer to recognition also . Rush r eport-
ed in June and July, 1822 , that the British policy was still against 
for mal recognition, but that more and more desire for it was being 
expressed, both in and out of Parliament . 100 Great Britain ' s first 
step toward r ecognition of Buenos Aires was a cormnercial treaty signed 
on July 23 , 1824, with official r ecognition being made on December 
31, 1824.101 
100 Manning , 9.12.• cit . , III , 1467, 1472-73 . 
lOl 'Ihe Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 
II, 73- 74 . - -
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
~ne revolutions of 1810 LD South America found the United 
States with almost no neutrality or recognition policy for r ebellious 
colonies. The events of the next fifteen years witnessed the formu-
lation of a series of laws that -would serve as the basis for .American 
neutrality and relations with South America . 
Questions have frequently been raised as to whether American 
policy during this period was formulated by the United States or 
actually was the result of European politics and events. There can 
be no denial that European happenings influenced the carrying out of 
United States policy, but the policy formulated was basically .American, 
not European. The idea of independence for South America was accepted 
by the United States several years before .. :mch action was taken by 
any European state . The f act that the United States wa.ited as long 
as they did to acknowledge the independence of former Spanish colonies 
was caused by happenings in South .America as vvell as in Europe . 
President Monroe had made one of the qualifications for recognition 
a stable and orderly government . The f act that the United States 
waited for tl1is , even after serious threat of European intervention 
had passed,is another indication of the independence of American 
action. 
However , European :Lnfluences , especially that of Great Britain 
can not be disreg2rded entirely. TI1is was based upon the British 
friendship with Spain, her atte~pts at mediation, the desire for war 
88 
with the United States by many Englishmen, and the uncertainty of 
British actions in connection w:i.th the rest of Europe . '.Ihe influence 
was considerRble , but it a cted only to check any radical American 
action more than to delay the eventual recognition . 
'.Ihe effect of the Florida negotiations on American recognition 
has been a subject for heated debate . Spain had at tempted to make 
non- recognition a part of the treaty, but as would be expected, the 
United States refused to see any connection between the two . By 1821, 
it had become apparent that the recognition of the South American 
governments would have to be made first by either Spain or the United 
States . Florida was of too nruch :iJrrportance to the United Stat es to 
be thrown away just for an act of recognition, which would eventually 
take place anyway. Independence of South Ameri ca was assured; there-
fore recognition was not of immediate need to the South American 
cause . Monroe was severely criticized fo.c purchasing Florida at the 
expense of South American recognition , but there seems to be little 
justification for criticism. No doubt , SpaL~ was surprised that recog-
nition was not made immediately after the ratification of the treaty. 
Th.e fact that more than a year was to elaspe before any act of f oriml 
recognition was ta.ken is a strong indication of the independence of 
American action . Prompt Spanish ratification of the treaty might 
have brought r ecognition at an earlier date , but it is doubtful if 
the difference in time would have been more than a few months . 
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Neutrality Act of 17941 
Sec._!. Be it enacted and declared }2y the Senate and House 
of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress~-
sembled, That if any citizen of the United States shall , within the 
territory or jurisdiction of the same, accept and exercise a commis-
sion to serve a for eign prince or state in war by land or sea, the 
person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, 
and shall be fined not more than 'GVlfo thousand dollars, and shall be 
irnprisoned not exceeding three yea.rs. 
Sec . ~ - And be it further enacted and declared, Tha t if any 
person shall within the territory or jurisdiction of the United 
States enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to 
enlist or enter himself , or to go beyond the limits or juricdiction 
of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the 
services of any foreign prince or state as a soldier, or as a marine 
or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque or 0 riva-
teer, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high 
misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars , 
and be imprisoned not exceeding three years: Provided, that this 
shall not be construed to extent to aey subject or citizen of a 
foreign prince or stat e v-rho shall transiently be within the United 
St ates and shall on board of a.IDJ vessel of war , letter of marque 
or privateer, which at t he time of its arrival within the United 
Stat es was fitted and equipped as such, enlist or enter himself to 
serve such prince or state on board such vessel of war, l etter of 
marque or privateer, if the United States shall be at peace with 
such prince or state : And provided further , That if any p erson so 
enlisted shall within thirty days after sue~ enlistment voluntarily 
discover, upon oath, to some justice of the peace or other civil 
magistrate the person or persons by whom he was so enlisted, so 
as that he or they may be apprehended and convicted of the said 
offense, such person so discovering the offender or offenders shall 
be indemnified from the penalty prescribed by this act. 
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted and declared, That if 
any persooshall wit hin any of the ports, harbors, bays, rivers or 
other waters of the United States, fit out and arm or attempt to fit 
out and arm or procure to be fitted out and armed, or shall lmowingly 
be concerned in the furnishing , fitting out or arming of any ship or 
ves sel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the 
service of any foreign pr ince or state to cruise or connnit hostili-
ties upon the subjects, citizens or property of another foreign 
1 Taken f rom John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the 
International Ar bitr ations to Which the United States Has Been a 
Party (Washington: Government Pr int ing Office , 1898 ), IV, 3978=80 . 
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I 
prince or state with whom the United States are at peace, or shall 
issue or deliver a commission within the territory or jurisdiction 
of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she 
may be employed as aforesaid, every such person so offending shall 
upon conviction be adjudged guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall 
be fined and impnsoned at the discretion of the court in which the 
conviction shall be had, so as the fine imposed shall b e in no case 
be more than five t housand dollars and the term of imnrisonment 
shall not exceed three years , and every such ship or ;essel with 
her tackle , apparel and furniture together with all mat erials, 
arms, ammunition and stores whi ch may have been procur ed for the 
building and .equipment thereof shall be forfeited, one- half for the 
use of any p.erson who shall give information of the offense and the 
other half to the use of the United States . 
Sec . 4. And be it further enacted and declared, That if 
any person shall within the territory or jurisdiction of the United 
States increase or augment, or procure to be increased or augmented, 
or shall be knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the f orce 
of any ship of war, cruiser or other armed vessel which at the time 
of her arrival within t he United St ates, was a ship of war , cruiser 
or armed vessel in the s ervice of a foreign prince or state or belong-
ing to the subjects or citizens of such prince whom the United States 
are at peace, by adding to_ the number or size of the guns of such 
vessel prepared for use, or by the addition t her eto of acy- equipment 
solely applicable to war , everiJ such person so offending shall upon 
convi ction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined 
and imprisoned at t he discretion of the court in which the conviction 
shall be had, so as that such fine shall not exceed one t housand 
dollars , nor the term of imprisonment be more t han one year . 
Sec . 5. And be it further enacted and declared, That if 
any persooshall within the territory or jurisdi ction of the United 
States begin or set on foot or provide or prepare the means fo r any 
military expedition or enter prise t o be carried on f r om t hence against 
the terr i t ory or dominions of any f oreign prince or state wi th whom 
the United States are a t peace, every such pe rson so offending shall 
suffer f i ne and imprisonment at the discretion of t he court in which 
the conviction shall be had, so as t hat such f ine shall not exceed 
three thousand dollars nor t he t erm of imprisonment be more than 
three years. 
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted and declared, Tha t the 
district courts shall take cognizance of compl aints by whomsoever 
insti tut ed, in cases of capture made 1ri t hi n t he waters of the 




t Sec . l· And be it further enacted and declared, That in 
every case in which a vessel shall be fitted out and anned , or 
a,1ttempt ed so t o be fitted out and anned, or i n which the force of 
aiiy vessel of war, cruiser or other anned vessel , shall be increased 
0.t, agumented, or in which my military expedition or enterprise shall 
b~ begtLn or set on foot contrary to the prohi bitions and provisions 
of this act; and in every case of the captur e of a ship or vessel 
within t he jurisdiction or protection of the United States as above 
defined, and in every case in which any proces s issuing out of any 
court of the United States , shall be disobeyed or resisted ' by any 
person or persons having the custody of any vessel of war, cruiser 
or other armed vessel of any foreign prince or sta t e , or of the 
subjects or citizens of such prince or state, in every such case 
it shall be lawful for the Presi dent of the United States, or such 
other person as he shall have empowered for that purrpose to employ 
such part of the land or naval forces of t he United .States or of the 
mili tia t hereof as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of 
taking possession of, and detain.i_ng any such ship or vessel, with 
her prize or prizes if any, in o:oder to the execution of t he prohi-
bitions and penalties of tbis act, and to t he restoring such pr i ze 
or prizes , in the cases in which restorati on shall have been adjudged, 
and also for the purpose of preventing the carr-ying on of any such 
expedition or enterprise from the territories of the United States 
against the territories or dominions of a foreign prince or state, 
nth whom the United States are at peace . 
Sec . 8. And be it further enacted and declared, That it 
shall be lawflil f~the President of the United States , or such other 
person as he shall have empowered for that purpos e, to employ such 
part of the land or naval forces of t he United States or of the 
militia thereof , as shall be necessa.r'J to compel any foreign ship or 
vessel to depart the United States, in all cases in which, by the 
laws of nati ons or treaties of the United States , they ought not 
to remain within the United States . 
Sec . 9. And be it further enacted, That nothing in the 
foregoing act- shall beconstrued to prevent the prosecution or 
punishment of treason, or any piracy defined by a treaty or other 
law of the United States. 
Sec . 10 . And be it further enacted, That this act shall 
continue and be in force for and during the term of two years , and 
from thence to the end of the next session of Co?gress , and no 
longer . 
Approved, June 5, 1794. 
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Instructions to Joel Robert Poinsett2 
Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to Joel Robert Poinsett of South 
Carolina, appointed Special Agent of the United States to South 
America. 
Washington, June 28 , 1810 
Sir: 
As a crisis is approaching which must produce great changes 
in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve altogether 
its colonial relations to Europe , and as the geopgraphical position 
of the United States, and other obvious considerations, give them 
an intimate interest in whatever may effect the destiny of that part 
of the American continent, it is our du°t'J to turn our attention to 
this important subject, and to take such steps, not incompatable 
with the neutral character and honest policy of the United States, 
as the occasion renders proper. With this view, you have been 
selected to proceed, without delay, to Buenos Ayres . You wlll make 
it your object, wherever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression 
that the United States charish the sincerest good will tcwards the 
people of Spanish 1\m.er i ca as neighbors, as belonging to the same 
portion of the globe , and as having a mutual interest in cultivating 
friendly intercourse: that this disposition will eJCi.st, wbatever 
may be their internal system or European r elation, with respect to 
which no interference of any sort is pretended: and that, in the 
event of a political separation from the parent country, and of the 
establishment of an independent syste.1 of National Government, it 
will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United St~tes 
to promote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal inter-
course, between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all 
a coI1ID1on interest, and as lying under a common obligation to main-
tain that system of peace, justice, and good will, which is the 
only source of happiness for nations. 
Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions 
of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those 
on the other side, not only towards, the United States, but in refer-
ence to the great nations of Europe, and to the co:rrnnercial and 
other connections with tham, respectively: and, generally, to in-
quire into the state, the characterist:i.cs, and the proportions , as 
to number, intelligence, and wealth, of the several pa:rties , the 
amount of population, the extent and organization of the military 
force, and the pecuniary resources of the country. 
2 Taken from William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence 
of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American 
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), I, 6-7. 
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The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to 
explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States , to 
promote liberal and stable regulations , and to transmit seasonable 
information on the sub ject . Inorder that you may render the more 
service in this r espect , and t hat you may, at the same time , enjoy 
the greater protection and respectability, you will be furnished 
vrith a credential letter, such as is held by sundry agents of the 
United States in the West Indies , and as vms lately held by one 
at the Havana, and under the sanction of which you 1vill give the 
requisite attention to commercial objects. 
(The above is an extract from the complete instructions . ) 
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Declaration of Independence of the United Provinces of R{o de la Plata3 
We, the representatives of the United Provinces of Rio de 
la Plata, in general congress assembled, invoking the Supreme Being 
who presides over the universe, and calling on heaven, earth, and 
mankind, to 11vitness the justice of our cause, in the name and in 
virtue of the authority of the people wh0m we represent--
Solemnly declar e, that it is t he unanimous will of the 
people of these provinces to break asunder all t he bonds which 
unite them with the King of Spain; to reinstate themselves in the 
enjoyment of the rights of which they have been deprived; and to 
raise . themselves to the high rank of a free and independent nation, 
capable of giving themselves such a goverrnnent as justice and imper-
ious ci rcumstances may require . Authorized by the United Provinces 
in general, and by each of them in particular, to declare and lay 
them under the obligation to suyport this independence , we hereby 
pledge our lives, fortunes , and sacred honor . 
Mindful of the respect due to t hose nations which take an 
interest in our fate , and conscious of the necessity of decl aring 
the weighty reasons which have impelled us to this act, we r esolve 
that a manifest, setting them forth, be immediately made public . 
· Given and signed in t he hall of our sittings, sealed vvith 
the seal of the Congress, and co1111tersigned by our Secretaries , in 
the city of Tucuman, this 9th day of July, 1816. 
J . M. Serrano 
J. J. Passe 
Secretaries 
F. N. DE LAPRIDA , President 
3 Taken from Annals of Congress , 15th Congress , 1st Session, 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1849), 1877. 
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Loan Arranged by Agent John Devereux:4 
Terms of a Loan, to be ne gotiated in the United States by 
the Agency of Mr. John Devereuso, •.• to the .Amount of two million 
of dollars, for the use of the Government of Buenos Ayres. 
1. The Government accepts the t wo millions of dollars and 
agrees to pay an interest of nine per cent per annium for the same. 
2. The Government will pay to the House of Jlf1r . John Devereuso, 
eight per cent, once for all of his agency or comrnission on this 
transaction. 
3. The Lenders are bound to deposit at •.• the two mil-
lions, in the General Treasury of Buenos Ayres three months and 
a half interest on which shall be paid in advance by t his Government . 
4 . The Government shall deposit for its ovm account & ••• 
risk, the whole Capital in the United States , at the time of making 
t he reimbursement . 
5. The Government will pay the first inter es t on the partial 
sums which may be received for six months , deducting therefrom the 
three month and a half above mentioned, and ~rill make t he payment 
to the Consul or agent of the United States, t aking upon themselves 
t he risk of r emitting t he interest, t he payment s of which shall be 
regularly made every Four Months. 
6. The Government shall not be bound to pay the Principal until 
Ten Years after t he conclusion of the pr esent war and, if befor e t he 
end of t hat t ime , it should choose to liquidate the Debt, payment i s 
to be admitted . 
7. The Government will receive the sum which may be ••• 
until the whole amount of the Capita be received, during t he space 
of 15 months , counting from t his date; t hat is to say, if t hE Congress 
of t he United States be in Session at the r eceipt of t his Communi -
cation, if not, t he t ime shall be 20 months , and after the expir ation 
of the time specified, it shall be at t heir option t o receive or not . 
And to the end t hat these conditions may have all t he force 
and effect necessary for t heir fulfillment on Both Sides by means of 
the Signature of t he Consul of the United States , t his Document has 
been respectively Signed by us both and countersigned by the Secre-
tary of the Treasu.r-J , in conf onni t y with a Copy duly verifi ed, and 
deposited i n t he proper office , for the uses and offi cial purposes 
which are or may be required. 
Buenos Ayres, 31, January 1817. 
4 State Department, MS . Notes from~ Ar gentine Legation, 
Vol. I, Part 1. The parts omitted in this document were not readable 
as taken from the microfilmed copy of t he original. 
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Neutrality Act of March 3, 18175 
An Act more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the 
United States. · 
Sec . 1 . Be it enacted, &c., That if any person shall, with-
in t he limits-of theUnited States fit out and arm, or attempt to fit 
out and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or shall know-
ingly be concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of 
any such ship or vessel, with int ent that such ship or vessel shall 
be employed in the service of any foreign Prince or State, or of any 
colony, district or people , to cruise or commit hostilities , or to 
aid or cooperate in any warlike measure whatever, against t he subjects , 
citizens , or property of any Prince or St ate, or of any colony, dis-
trict or people , with whom the United States are at peace, every 
such person so offending shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty 
of a high misdemeanor, and shall be find and imprisoned at the 
discretion of the court in which the conviction shall be had, so 
that t he fine to be imposed shall in no case be more than ten 
thousand dollar s , and the term of impnbsonment shall not exceed ten 
years; and every such ship or vessel, with her tackle , appar el, 
and furniture , together with all materials , arms , ammunition, and 
stores, which may have been procured for the building and equipment 
thereof , shall be forfeited, one half to the use of any person who 
shall give information, and t he other half to the use of the United 
States . 
Sec . 2 . And be it further enacted, That the owners of all 
ships, sailing out ofth~ports of t l e United States, and owned 
wholly, or in part, by citizens t hereof, shall enter into bond to 
the Unit ed St at es , with sufficient sureties , prior to clearning out 
the same , in double t he amount of the value of the vessel and cargo 
on board, including her armament, that the said ship or vessel , shall 
not be employed by such ovmer s in cruising or committing hostilities , 
or in aiding or co- operating in any warlike measure against t he 
subjects , citizens , or property of any Prince or St ate , or 0£ any 
colony, dis tri ct, or people , wi t h whom the United States are a t peace. 
Sec . 3. And be it further enacted, That t he collectors of 
the customs be, and t hey are hereby, respectively authorized and 
required to detain any vessel manifestly built for warlike purposes , 
and about to depart from the United States, of wh ich the car go s hall 
principally consist of arms and munitions of war, ·when the number of 
5 Taken from Annals of Congress , 14th Congr ess , 2nd Session 
(Washington : Gales and Seaton, 1849), 1308- 10 , 
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men shipped on board, or other ci rcumstances, shall render it probably 
that such vessel i s intended to be employed by the owner or owners 
to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or 
property of any Prince or State, or of any colony, district, or 
people with whom the United States are at peace, until the decision 
of the President be had t hereupon, or until the owner enters into 
bdnd and sureties to the Uni ted States prior to clearing·-; out the 
same, in double the amount of t he value of the vessel and cargo 
on board, including her armament, that t he said ship or vessel shall 
not be employed by the owner or owners in cruis i ng or commi t ting 
hostilities , or in aiding or co-operating in any warlike measure 
against the district, or peopl e with whom the United States are at 
peace. 
Sec . k, !u9: be it further enacted, That if any pe rson 
shall, wi t hin the territOY"J or jurisdiction of the United States, 
increase or augment , or procure to be increased or augmented, or 
shall be knOV'ringly concerned in i ncreas i ng or augmenting the force 
of aey ship-of - war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which, at the t ime 
of her arrival within the United States, was a ship-of -war , cruiser, 
or armed vessel in the service of a foreign Prince or State , or of 
any such Prince, State, colony, district, or people, the same bei ng 
at war with any foreign Prince or State with whom the United States 
are at peace, by adding t o the number or size of the guns of such 
vessels prepared for use, or by the addition thereto of aey equip-
ment solely applicable to war , every such pe rson, so of f ending, 
shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
shall be fined and .imprisoned at t he discretion of the court in 
which the conviction shall be had, so as that such f ines shail not 
exceed one thousand dollars, nor the term of imprisonment be more 
than one year. 
Sec. S. And be it further enacted, That this act shall 
continue in force fortheterm of two years. 
Approved, March 3, 1817. 
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Commission Issued to McGregor6 
The deputies of free America , r es ident in the United States 
of the North, to their compatriot Gregor McGregor, gener al of Bri-
gade in the service of the United Provinces of New Granada and Ven-
ezuela, greeting : . 
Whereas it is highly impor t ant t o the interest of the peopl e 
whom we have the honor t o r epresent, t bat possess ion should be taken, 
without loss of time , of East and West Florida, and the blessings 
of free ins t i tutions and the security of thei r nat ural right s :iJnpar ted 
to their inhabltants, in pursuance of qur instructions, and in con-
formit y t o the desires of our r esnect i ve Gov ernment s, we have commis-
sioned Br igadier General Gcl:gor McGregor for t he purpcs e :---oL .Garrying 
into execution, either wholly or in part, an enterpr i se so interesting 
to t he glorious cause in which we are engaged: 
Theref ore, taking int o considerati on your zeal and devot i on 
to the r epublic, we request you, in t he name of our constitut eJJJ.ts, 
to proceed, on your own r espons ibi lity and that of t he above-named 
provinces, to adopt such measur es as in your judgment may most 
effect ually tend to procure for our brethren of both t he Floridas, 
Eas t and West, t he speedy enj oyment of those benef i ts t o which t hey 
are invited by the importance of t heir geographical situation; and 
for that purpose we authorize you, without departing from the us ages 
·and customs of civilized nations in like cases, and the dueobser-
vance of · the laws of the Unit ed States, and particularly t hose 
r egulating t heir neutrality with forei gn Powers, to cause vessels 
to be armed without t he limits of t heir juri sdiction, and provision-
ally to grant r ank to naval and milit ary-off icers, unti l t he Govern-
ment to be established by the free i ll of t he said people can 
proVide in the most suitable mode f or the arrangement of their 
several departments; in t he execution of all which, the i ns tructions 
deli vered to you of t his date will s erve as your guide. 
Signed, seal ed, and delivered, at the city of Philadelphia, 
t he 31st of March 1817. 
Lino De Clementa, Deputy f or Venezuela 
Pedro Gual, Depu ty f or New Granada 
Pedro Gual, Proxy for F. Zarate of Mexico 
/ / p Martin Thompson, Deputy f or Rio de la l ata 
6 Taken from American State Papers, Foreign Relations 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton;-1]5'8"), IV, 41~ 
Instructions to Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham? 
Rich Ru.sh, Secret ary of State ad int er im, to Caesar A. Rodney 
and John Gr aham, Special Commissioners of t he United St ates t o 
South Amer i ca 
Washington, July 18, 1817 
Gentlemen : 
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The contest bet ween Spain and the Spanish coloni es in the 
southern parts of this continent has been, from its commencement, 
highly interest i ng, under many views , to t he Uni ted States . As 
inhabi tants of t he same hemisphere , it was natural that we should 
feel a solicitude for the welfare of the colonist s . I t was never-
t heless our duty to maintain the neutral character with impartialit y 
and allow of no privileges of any kind t o one party, which were not 
ext ended to the other . The government of Spain viewing the colonies 
as in a state of r ebellion, has endeavored to impose upon foreign 
powers in their inter cour se with them, the conditions applicable to 
such a state . This pretension has not been acceded to by t his govern-
ment, which has considered t he contest in the light of a civil war, 
i n which t he parties were equal . An enti re conviction exists that 
t he view taken on t his point has been correct, and that t he United 
Stat es have fully sati sfied every just· claim of Spain. 
In other respects we have been made to· fee l sensibly the 
progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized and condemned, 
our citizens made . capt i ves and our l awful commerce , even at a dis-
tance from the theatre of the war, een interrupted . Acting vvith 
impartiality towards the ·parties , we have endeavored to secure from 
each a just return . In whatever quarter t he authority of Spain was 
abrogated and an independent government erected, it was essential 
to the security of our rights that we s hould enjoy its fr iendship . 
Spain could not impose conditions on other powers incident to 
complete sovereignty in pl aces where she did not maintain it . On 
this principle the United St ates have sent agents into the Spanish 
colonies , addressed to t he existing authority, whether of Spain ,or 
of the colony, with instructions to culti vate its friendship and 
secure as f ar as pr acticable the fait~~ul observance of our rights . 
The contest, by the extension of the revolutionary movement 
and the gr eater s t abi l ity which it appears to have acquired, becomes 
daily of more importance to the United Stat es . I t is by success 
that t he colonists acquir e new claims on other powers, which i t 
may comport neither with their i nter es t nor duty to disregard . 
7 Taken from Wi l liam R. Manning, Diplomatic Corr espondence 
of t he United St ates Concer ning t he I ndependence of the Latin -
American Nations (New York : Oxford University Press , 19~1, 42- L~4 . , 
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Several of the colonies having declared their independence and enjoyed 
it for some years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in others , 
it seems p robably that, if the parties be left to themselves, the 
most permanent politi cal changes will be effected . If therefore 
seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement in its 
subsequent steps with particular attention, vvi. th a view to pursue 
such a course as just regard for all those considerations which they 
are bound to respect may dictate. 
Under these impressions, t he President deems it a dut y to 
obtai n, in a manner more comprehensive than has heretofore been 
done, correct information of the actual state· of affairs in those 
colonies. For this pur pose he has appointed y ou commissioners, with 
authority to proceed, in a public ship, along t he coast of South 
America, touching at the points where it is probably that the most 
precise ·and ample knowledge may be gained . The Ontario, Captain 
Biddle , is prepared to recei ve y ou on board at New York , and wi ll 
have orders to sai l as soon as you are ready to embark . 
It i s t he President's desire that you go f irst to the River 
la Pl ate, visiting Buenos Ayres and Monte Video . On your way thither, 
you w'ill call at Rio Janeiro delivering to our minis t er at that 
court the desnatches which will be committed to your hands . On 
your .r eturn f;om Buen6s Ayres , you will also touch, should circum-
stances allow it, at St. Salvador and Pernambuco. You will thence 
proceed to the Spanish Main, going to Mar gar etta, Cumana, Barcel ona, 
Caracas and as far wes t ward as Carthagena, looking in at any other 
convenient ports or pl aces a s you coast along . 
In the diff erent provinces or tmms which you visit, your 
attention will be usef ully , i f not primarily, dravm to the follow-
ing · objects. 
1 . The form of government est ablished, with the amount of 
population and pecuniary res ources and the state and pr o-
porti on as to numbers intelligence and wealth of the con-
tending parties , wherever a contest exists. 
2 . The extent and organization of t he milit ary f orce on each 
side , with the means open to each of keeping it up. 
3. The names and characters of l eading men, whether in civil 
life or 'as military chiefs , wh ose conduct and opinions shed 
an influence upon events . 
4. The dispositions t hat prevail among the public author i ties 
·· and pe ople towards the United States and towards the gr eat 
nations of Europe , .vvith the probability of commercial or 
other connections being on foot, or desired, with either. 
·5 . The principal arti cles of commerce, regarding t he export 
and import trade. What articles from· the United St ates 
find the best marke t ? What prices do t heir productions, 
mos t useful in the United Sta tes, usually bear? The duties 
on exports and imports ; are ali nations charged t he same? 
6. The principal ports and har bors , with t he wor ks of def ense. 
7. The real prospect, so f ar as seems justly inferrable from 
existi ng events and t he operation of causes as well moral 
as physical in all the provinces where a struggle is going 
on, of t he final and permanent issue . 
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8. The probably durability of the government s that have already· 
been established with their credit, and the extent of t heir 
author i ty, in relation to ad joining provinces. This r emark 
will be especially appl i cable to Buenos Ayres . If there be 
arrj reason to think, t hat the governrnent- established there 
is not likely to be permanent , as to which no opinion is 
here expressed, it will become desirable to ascertain the 
probably character and poli cy of t hat which i s expected to 
succeed it . 
9. In Caracas it i s understood that t here ·i s , at present, no 
government , but t hat the fo rces are united under General 
Bolivar. It mi ght be useful t o know, whether any and what 
connection exists between t his chief, and the chiefs or 
rulers at St . Domingo; also t he number of negroes in arms . 
Your stay at each place will not be longer t han is necessary 
to a fair accomplishment of t he ob j ects hel d up . You 1tlll s ee the 
propriety, in all instances , of showing respect to t he existing 
authority or. goverrnnent of whatever king i t may be , and of mingling 
a conciliatory demeanor with a strict observance of all establi shed 
usages . 
The tract marked out for your voyage has been deemed the 
most eligible; but you will not consider yourselves as positively 
restricted to t he limits or places specified . You will be free 
to deviate and touch at other pl a ces as your ovm judgments , acting 
upon c i rcumstances and looking to the objects in view, may point 
but. ,. In. t his respect the commander of the shi p will have orders 
to conform t o such directi ons as you may think fit to give him. 
You will however call first at Rio Janeiro, and go no further south 
t han Buenos Ayres . At t his point i t is hoped t hat you may be able 
to command the means of obtai ning useful information as respe cts 
Chili and Peru. You will also not fail to go to the Spani sh Main, 
returning t o the United States a t as early a day as will comport 
wit h t he nature and extent of your mission . Your observation and 
enquires will not be exclusively confine d t o the heads fudicated, 
but t .ake other scope , keeping to the spirit of t hese instructions , 
as your mm view· of t hings upon the spot may suggest . 
I t only remains for me to add , that t he President has 
gr eat confidence in t he ability and discretion with whi ch you 
will execute , in all things , the trust cormnitted to you, and that 
he anticipated f r om y our report t o this department such a stat ement 
of facts and views as may prove highly useful to the nation . 
I have t he honor, etc. 
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Instructions to Caesar A. Rodney, John Graham and Theordorick Bland8 
John Quincy Adams , Secretary of State , to Caesar A. Rodney, John 
Graham and Theodorick Bl and, Special Commissioners of the United 
States to South Amer i ca . 
W~shington, November 21 , 1817 
Gentlemen: 
In reviewing the Ins tructions to you from t his Department 
of ·18 July, a copy of which has been furni shed to Mr . Bland, the 
President finds little in them, which subsequent observations t o 
you, relating to the execution of the trust committed to you, may be 
not inexpedient . 
You will as before directed proceed in the first instance to 
Rio Janeiro, & there deliver the despatches committed to you, for 
Mr . Sumter . From thence you w"i-11 go th Buenos .Ayres , but without 
touching at St . Salvador or Pernambuco . On your return you will 
visit such places of the Spanish Ma in, as you shall yourselves deem 
expedient ·without being restricted to any of t he places mentioned 
in your former Instructions • 
.Among t he objects , to which it i s des~red that you will 
call the attention of the existi ng revolutionary authorities, ird. th 
whom you may have occasion to enter into connnunication, wiLl be 
the irregular , :injurious , and it is hoped unwarranted -use of their 
flags and of Commissions real or pr etended derived from them. 
You have been made acquainted through the public channels 
of information, with t he lod@nents which separate the successive 
bands of these adventur ers have made at ll.melia Island and at Gal-
veston. At the former , possession was f irst taken early in the 
course of last summer , by: a party, under the command of a British 
subject named M1Gregor, pretending authority from Venezuela . He was 
succeeded by persons disgracing and forfeiting by such acts the 
character of Citizens of the Unit ed States, and pretending authority 
from some pretended Government of Florida; and they are now by 
the last accounts received, sharing the fruits of their depr edation, 
at the same time contesting the cormnand of the pl ace with a French-
man having under him a body of Blacks from St . Domingo, and pretend-
ing authority from a Government of Mexico . In the mean time the 
pl ace from its immediat e vicinity to the Vnited States, has bec ome 
a receptacle for fugitive negroes , for every species of illici t 
traffic, and for slave- trading ships by means of which multitudes of 
African Blacks are surreptitiously introduced into the Southern 
8 Taken from William R. Manni ng, Diplomatic Correspondence 
of the United States Concerning the I ndependence of the Latin-
American Nations (New Yor k : Oxford University Press, 19~I, 48- 49. 
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States and Territories , in defiance of the Laws . The Revenue, 
Morals , and the Peace of the country are so seriously menaced and 
compromitted by this state of thing, that the President after observ-
ing the feeble and ineffectual effort made by the Spanish Government 
of Florida, to recover possession of the Island, and the apparent 
inability of Spain to accomplish that recovery, has determined to 
break up this nest of foreign Adventurers , with_ pretended South 
American commissions , but among whom not a single South American 
name has yet appeared . The settlement at Galveston is of the same 
character and will be treated in -the same mami.er . Possession will 
be taken 0f Galveston as within the limits of the United States; 
and of Amelia Island, to prevent the repetition of the same misuse 
of it in the future, and subject to explanations to be given of the 
Revolutionary Governments with whom you may communicate have really 
authorized any of these foreign Adventures to take possession of 
those places, you will explain to them that this measure could not 
be submitted to or acquiesced in by the United States; because 
Galveston is considered as within their limits, and Amelia Island 
is too insignificant in itself and too important by its local position 
in reference to the United States , to be left by them in the pos-
session of such persons . 
You will at the same time remonstrate to them in the most 
serious manner against the practice i tself of issuing indiscriminate 
Commissions, to trnabondoned and desperate characters of all 
other nations, whose objects is using their authority and their 
flags, are not to promote the cause of their Liberty and Inder;endence, 
but merely to amass plunder for themselves. You will inform them 
that a citizen of the United States cannot accept and act under 
such a commission, without at once violating the Laws of his 
country, and forfeiting his rights and character as a citizen. 
That the fitting out of privateers in our Ports , to cruize either 
for or against them is prohibited by our laws; t hat many such 
privateers have been fitted out in our Ports, (unknovm to this 
Government) and though manned and officered entirely by people of 
this country they have captured the property of na t ions with whom 
we are at peace, and have used the flags sometimes of more than 
one of the South American Governments , just as it suited their 
purposes to be Officers of Buenos Ayres or of Chili, of Caraccas 
or of Venezuela. That if these clandestine and illegal armaments 
in our Ports have been made with the sanction and by the authority 
of those Governments , the United States have just cause to complain 
of them, and to claim satisfaction and indemnity for all losses 
and damages vnuch may result to them or to any of their citizens 
from them; and if they have not been thus authorized, it would 
be but justly reasonable that those Governments should not only 
publicly disavav, them, but in issuing their commissions and author-
izing the use of their flags, subject them at least to the restrictions 
conformable to the Law of Nations . That the licentious abuse of 
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their flags by these freebooters, of every nation but their ONn, 
has an influence unpropitious to the cause of their freedom, and 
tendency to deter other countries from recognizing them as regular 
Governments. 
It is expected that your absence from the United States will 
be of seven or eight months. But if while in the execution of your 
Instructions at Buenos Ayres you should find it expedient, or useful 
with reference to the public service, that one or more of you should 
proceed over land to Chili, you are authorized to act accordingly . 
Should only one of you go , he will there co-operate jointly with 
Mr . J. B. Prevost, whom it is probably he will find already there, 
and a copy of whose Instructions is herewith furnished . The com-
pensation which the President has thought proper to fix for the 
performance of the service assigned to you is of six thousand dollars 
to each of you; from which it is understood you are to defray all 
your expenses while on shore. Stores have been provided for you, 
for the passage, both outward and returning . You will c01mminicate 
with the Department, by any direct opportunity that may occur from 
any of the Ports at which you may touch . 
I have the honor, etc . 
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Neutrality Act of March 3, 18199 
An Act to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the 
crime of piracy . 
Sec . 1 . Be it enacted, &c ., That the President of the 
United States-be,andhe hereby is , authorized and requested to 
employ so many of the public anned vessels , as , in his judgment , 
the service may require , with suitable instructions to the com-
manders therof, in protecting the merchant vesseJs of the United 
States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations . 
Sec . 2. And be it further enacted, That the President of 
the United States be , andhereby is , authorized to instruct the 
cDIIDllanders of the public armed vessels of the Uni ted States to 
subdue, seize, take , and send into any port of the Uni ted States, 
any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat, the crew whereof 
shall be anned, and which shall have attempted or committed any 
piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure , 
upon any other vessel; and also to retake any vessel of the United 
States , or its citizens , which may have been unla, fully captured 
upon the high seas . 
Sec . J . And be it further enacted, That the commander and 
crew of any merchant vessel of the United States, owned wholly or 
in part, by a citizen thereof, may oppose an defend against any 
aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, which shall 
be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any such vessel, or upon any 
armed vessel whatsoever , not being a public armed vessel of some 
nation in amity with the United States; and may subdue and capture 
the same; and may also retake any vessel , owner as aforesaid, which 
may have been captured by the commander or cr ew of any such armed 
vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States . 
Sec. Li . And be it further enacted, That whenever any 
vessel or boat, from which any piratical aggression, search, restraint, 
depredation, or seizure, shall have been first attempt.ed or made , 
sha11 be captured and brought into any port of the United States , 
the same shall and may be adjudged and condemned to their use, and 
that of the captors, after due process and trial, in any court 
having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the 
district in which such captured vessel shall be brought; and the same 
court shall therefore order a sale and distribution thereof accord-
ingly, and at their discretion . 
9 Taken from Annals of Congress , 15th Congress, 2nd Session 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1849), 2523- 24 . 
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Sec . 2· And be it further enacted, That if any person 
or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of 
piracy, as defined by the laws of nations , and such offender or 
offenders shall afterwards be brought into , or found in, the United 
States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction 
thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the dis-
trict into which he or they may be brought, or in which he or they 
shall be found , be punished with death . 
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That t his act shall 
be in force untiltheendof the next session of Congress. 
Approved, March 3, 1819. 
